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Re-Clarifying China’s Trust Law: 
Characteristics and New Conceptual Basis 
LYU, KAI 
Abstract: The common law trust institution always encounters 
modifications when it is transplanted to civil law jurisdictions. China 
designs its Trust Law with three characteristics in the process of 
localization: indeterminate title of trust assets, settlor’s intrusive rights, 
and beneficiary’s right in personam with two peculiarities.  By virtue of 
these characteristics, Chinese lawmakers and politicians expect to make 
the trust institution more acceptable for the general public and 
orchestrated with the civil law tradition. However, these characteristics 
give rise to theoretical confusions and practical obstacles. This 
unintended result is not caused by insufficient rules in the Trust Law but 
by a deficient conceptual basis within the Chinese jurisprudence that is 
needed to underpin the trust institution. This paper addresses this 
problem by testing the prevailing contract theory and the novel special 
patrimony theory and, after systematic analyses, finds that the special 
patrimony theory works better to conceptualize China’s Trust Law. This 
finding may provide some reflections to other trust-reception civilian 
jurisdictions to understand the trust institution. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Generally, a common law trust arises when a person, the settlor1 or 
trustor, transfers its title to trust assets to another person, the trustee, 
who is obliged to deal with the trust assets as a separate fund for the 
benefit of a third party, the beneficiaries, or for a specific purpose.2 As a 
unique institution originating in England,3 Maitland highly appraised it 
as “the greatest and most distinctive achievement performed by 
Englishmen in the field of jurisprudence.”4 Many civil law jurisdictions 
have incorporated this particular institution into their legal systems. By 
the early twentieth century, it was brought into China by its foreign 
conquerors.5 When the Chinese Communist Party took over Mainland 
China in 1949 and promoted socialism thereafter, the trust institution 
was viewed as a manifestation of capitalist ideology and thereby 
blocked by the Party.6 The trust institution reemerged again in the early 
1980s after Chinese reformists implemented the “Reform and Opening-
 
 1. The word “settlor” is also spelled as “settler” in some sources referred to in the paper. 
 2. See DAVID HAYTON ET AL., LAWS RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 2 (18th ed. 
2010); GARY WATT, TRUSTS AND EQUITY 18 (3d ed. 2008). 
 3. PHILIP H. PETTIT, EQUITY AND THE LAW OF TRUSTS 12 (11th ed. 2006); FREDERICK 
WILLIAM MAITLAND ET AL., EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 23-42 (2nd ed. 1949). Trust 
developed from the ancient “use” in England and then was widely used in the family successions 
and charitable donations. For an elaboration of the gradual development of “use”, see generally 
N.G. Jones, Uses, Trusts, and a Path to Privity, 56(1) CAMBRIDGE L.J. 175 (1997). 
 4. FREDERIC MAITLAND, SELECTED HISTORICAL ESSAYS 129 (1957). 
 5. Mujie Sheng, Jiuzhongguo Jinrongye de Xintuo Yewu [The Trust Business of Financial 
Industry in China before 1949], 2 J. OF SHANGHAI FIN. 20, 20 (1980) (China). 
 6. The Chinese Communist Party carried out a society-reconstruction project called 
“socialist transformation” in the 1950s and then launched a one-decade “culture revolution” 
spanning from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. Both the socialist transformation and culture 
revolution were designed to advance socialism in China by removing capitalist elements from the 
Chinese society. 
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up Policy.”7 Since then, three demands had fueled the rapid growth of 
trust: (1) banks setting up trust subsidiaries to provide financial services 
that banks were not allowed to do; (2) local governments establishing 
trust investment companies to channel extra-budgetary funds to local 
infrastructure projects for higher returns; and (3) the central government 
creating trust companies to bridge overseas capital with cash-starved 
domestic enterprises.8 
It is worth noting that the name “trust company” is misleading 
because most services those trust companies offered at that moment, 
such as taking household deposits and providing loans, underwriting 
securities, and engaging in real property development, were not genuine 
trusts.9 Trust companies were superficially labeled as “trust” providers 
when they in truth merely provided agent or banking services.10 These 
companies brought about oversupply of capital and excessive liquidity, 
which gave rise to unscrupulous competition and economic bubbles.11 In 
response, authorities tried several methods to rectify the situation, 
including shutting down highly-indebted trust companies, consolidating 
small-scale trust companies, and restricting trust companies from 
providing non-trust businesses and services.12 
Unfortunately, most of these administrative rectifications ended up 
in failure. The most important reason for this failure is probably due to 
the absence of a formal trust code in China. The sole rule regulating 
trust companies at that time contained only thirty-three simple, dry 
articles.13 These articles not only failed in helping to clarify the concept 
 
 7. Immanuel Gebhardt & Holger Hanisch, Development of the Chinese Trust Law – an 
Overview, in  DRAFTING MATERIALS COLLECTION OF CHINA’S TRUST 262 (Shaoping Zhu & Yi 
Ge eds., 2002). The reform and opening-up policy shifted the national focus from enforcing 
socialism to developing economy by introducing capitalist market principles. 
 8. Anjali Kumar et al., China’s Non-Bank Financial Institutions: Trust and Investment 
Companies (1997) World Bank Discussion Paper, 1-2, available at 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/0-8213-3888-9. 
 9. XIAOMING ZHOU, XINTUO ZHIDU BIJIAOFA YANJIU [A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
TRUST INSTITUTION] 181 (1996) (stating that trust companies issued bonds in off-shore markets 
and took domestic deposits as banks in the form of “trust deposits”, and then extended collected 
credit to business ventures through “trust investments” and “trust loans”). 
 10. Lusina Ho, Xintou Lifa Buyi Caozhiguoji [A Law of Trust for the PRC: A Note of 
Caution], 1 PEKING U. L. REV. 618, 618 (1998) (China) [hereinafter Ho, A Law of Trust for the 
PRC]. 
 11. See generally Zhicheng He and Ping Wang, Woguo Jinrongye de Xinqi he Ta de Lishi 
Juxianxing [The Emergence and Historical Limitation of China’s Financial Trust Industry], 6 J 
FIN. STUD. 25 (1990) (China). 
 12. Shuli Zhou, Dui Woguo Jinrong Xintuoye de Huigu yu Zhanwang [The Retrospect and 
Prospect of China’s Financial Trust Industry], 12 J. FIN. STUD. 25, 25-27 (1990) (China). 
 13. The rule was called “Provisional Regulations for Financial Trust and Investment 
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and governance of trust, but they were also unsuccessful in helping to 
build a comprehensive regulatory structure for trust companies to 
follow. Due to this deficient legal framework, academic scholars, 
industry experts, and even the regulators themselves appealed to 
legislators for “the making of a [Chinese] Trust Law” for a long time.14 
Lianzhou Wang, chair of the Drafting Committee of the Trust Law, 
noted himself that there is not only an urgent need to elaborate the legal 
foundation of the trust institution, but to also regulate trust activities and 
align the legal system with China’s market economy reform.15 
The legislation of the Trust Law, however, experienced a number 
of twists and turns. 
The First Trust Bill, completed in 1996, was rejected by the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) on the grounds of there being too 
many controversial propositions.16 The Second Trust Bill, completed in 
2000, failed to make it through the NPC due to the rotation of new 
standing members of the NPC.17 After two attempts, the NPC finally 
passed the Third Trust Bill, which came into force on October 1, 2001.18 
In contrast to other jurisdictions more receptive to the concept of 
Trust, China’s Trust Law was designed with several distinguishing 
characteristics. The first is the indeterminate ownership of trust assets, 
which means that the title to trust assets could be vested in either the 
 
Companies,” promulgated by the People’s Bank of China and effective from April 26, 1986 to 
January 12, 2001. 
 14. Xiao Zhang, Background Information on the Drafting Process, in DRAFTING 
MATERIALS COLLECTION OF CHINA’S TRUST LAW 278 (Shaoping Zhu & Yi Ge eds., 2002). 
 15. Lianzhou Wang, Urgent Need for Chinese Trust Law, in DRAFTING MATERIALS 
COLLECTION OF CHINA’S TRUST LAW 284-88 (Shaoping Zhu & Yi Ge eds., 2002). 
 16. For example, there were considerable disputes on whether regulations on trust 
companies shall be integrated into the Trust Law; what the business scope and functions of trust 
companies shall be specified; what kind of legal principles shall be adopted to guide the 
rectification of trust companies; and how to handle their rights and obligations. See id., at 289. 
 17. Wang said the failure of the ‘Second Trust Bill’ was an “unexpected interlude” in the 
legislation of the Trust Law. Because the Drafting Committee had already elaborated the 
background and reasons to lay down the Trust Law in front of the NPC when the ‘First Trust Bill’ 
was submitted for approval in 1997, the Drafting Committee thought that it was duplicative to 
explain the background and reasons of legislation to the NPC when the ‘Second Trust Bill’ was 
submitted for authorization in 2000. However, most standing members of the NPC had been 
replaced, and new members did not understand the importance of the Trust Law. As a result, the 
‘Second Trust Bill’ was denied. See Lianzhou Wang, Zhonghua Renmin Gonghegou Xintuofa de 
Qianshi Jinsheng (Xilie Yi) [The History and Development of PRC’s Trust Law (Part I)], 62 
TRUST WEEKLY 3, 24 (2011) (China) [hereinafter Wang, The History and Development of PRC’s 
Trust Law (Part I)]. 
 18. Trust Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 28, 2001, effective Oct. 1, 2001) (China), Preamble [hereinafter Trust 
Law 2001 (China)]. 
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settlor or the trustee. This characteristic is significant because only very 
few jurisdictions have the indeterminate ownership locus.19 The second 
characteristic is the extensive rights afforded to the settlor by the Trust 
Law. This feature is less special since many offshore jurisdictions have 
also done so even though the title to trust assets is typically vested in the 
trustee in these jurisdictions.20 The third characteristic is the nature of 
the beneficiary’s right, which is a right in personam in China. This is 
different from the orthodox Anglo-American trust model that 
traditionally vests an equitable title in the beneficiary, but it is widely 
shared by civilian jurisdictions recognizing the trust.21 The two 
peculiarities of the beneficiary’s right—relative nature and bankruptcy 
remoteness— however, make the beneficiary’s right different from a 
usual right in personam when viewed under the Chinese civilian system. 
Why does China’s Trust Law have these characteristics? How 
should they be understood in the Chinese context? What is the 
conceptual basis of a trust in China? Following the introduction, Part II 
will delve into the topic of the indeterminate ownership of trust assets 
by presenting scholarly debates and political concerns. Part III will 
analyze the settlor’s extensive rights from both a legal and political 
perspective. Part IV will first explore the nature of the beneficiary’s 
right by examining scholars’ arguments and by reviewing the historical 
evolution of the trust in common law. After that, Part IV will spell out 
the beneficiary’s right as a right in personam with two peculiarities: 
relative nature and bankruptcy remoteness. Based on these 
characteristics, Part V will try to conceptualize the Trust Law by testing 
 
 19. It is said that the Israeli trust regime under the Trust Act of 1979 is the world’s first 
shapeless trust regime. Shapeless trust means there is no determinate ownership locus of trust 
assets. However, this character in Israel may be about to be swept away in the new Civil Law 
Bill, which “moves Israeli trust law much closer to Anglo-American orthodoxy” and “redefines a 
trustee as the owner of property.” Adam Hofri, Shapeless Trusts and Settlor Title Retention: As 
Asian Morality Play, 58 LOY. L. REV. 135, 169 (2012). 
 20. See, e.g., TRUSTS (JERSEY) LAW 1984, Article 9A, inserted by the L.21/2006 
Amendment, which stipulates that powers reserved by a settlor “shall not affect the validity of the 
trust nor delay the trust taking effect.” These powers may include power “to revoke, vary or 
amend the terms of a trust,” power to manage the payment of trust benefits, power “to appoint or 
remove any trustee, protector or beneficiary,” power to direct the administration of the trustee, 
and power to restrict any powers of the trustee. A new s.15, expressly authorizing the reservation 
or grant of certain powers by or to a settlor, was introduced into the Trusts (Guernsey) Law in the 
2007 Amendment. Similar legislations could also be seen in Bahamian Trustee Act 1998 and San 
Marino Trust Law 2010.  
 21. In many civilian jurisdictions, such as Russia, Luxembourg, France, Liechtenstein, 
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, the beneficiary has a right in personam against the trustee. 
Lusina Ho, TRUST LAW IN CHINA 37-38 (2003).  
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the stereotypical contract theory and the compelling special patrimony 
theory. After elaborating on these theories and carefully comparing 
them with the Trust Law, Part V will argue that the special patrimony 
theory provides a reasonable conceptual foundation to China’s Trust 
Law. This paper will end with a short concluding Part VI. 
II. THE INDETERMINATE OWNERSHIP OF TRUST ASSETS 
In common law, it has been well established that the settlor should 
do everything necessary in his or her power to transfer trust assets to the 
trustee unless the settlor declares himself or herself as the trustee.22 The 
trustee owns the legal title of trust assets while the beneficiary owns the 
equitable title. In civil law where there is only one title to each 
property,23 there are four usual scenarios to vest the title to trust assets. 
The first scenario is that the settlor transfers the ownership of the trust 
assets to the trustee, who holds them in the interest of the beneficiary;24 
this is the most common approach.25 The second scenario is that the 
settlor retains ownership of the trust assets but delegates the 
management power over these assets to the trustee.26 In the third 
scenario, the beneficiary is the legal owner of trust assets while the 
trustee merely has exclusive powers to manage and dispose of them.27 
This is called “bewind-trust” in the Netherlands and South Africa, 
which possibly are the only two examples in civilian jurisdictions.28 The 
 
 22. Milroy v. Lord, 4 De GF & J 264 (1862), per Turner LJ (“[I]n order to render a 
voluntary settlement valid and effectual, the settler must have done everything which, according 
to the nature of the property compromised in the settlement, was necessary to be done in order to 
transfer the property and render the settlement binding upon him.”). See also Re Rose [1952] Ch. 
499, [1951] 1 All ER 1217. 
 23. Donovan WM Waters, The Future of the Trust Part I, 13 J. INT’L TR. & CORP. PLAN. 
179, 182 (2006) (stating that “The civil law whose Roman roots are long pre-feudal has no 
doctrine of an estate or interest interposed between the person and the thing owned by the person; 
and therefore, there can be no division of the rights of ownership between two or more persons.”). 
 24. LUSINA HO, TRUST LAW IN CHINA 37-38 (2003) (hereinafter HO, TRUST LAW IN 
CHINA). Self-declaration trust also belongs to this scenario. Although the settlor declares herself 
as the trustee and trust assets are not transferred, they are held by the settlor in the status as 
trustee. 
 25. Id. (listing civil law jurisdictions and mixed jurisdictions that vest the title of trust assets 
in the trustee, including Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Russia, Luxembourg, Cayman Island, 
Jersey, Guernsey, Scotland, South Africa, and Sri Lanka). 
 26. Id. at 41. 
 27. H.L.E. Verhagen, Trusts in the Civil Law: Making Use of the Experience of ‘Mixed’ 
Jurisdictions, 3 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 477, 496 (2000). 
 28. Tony Honoré, Obstacles to the Reception of Trust Law? The Examples of South Africa 
and Scotland, in AEQUITAS AND EQUITY: EQUITY IN CIVIL LAW AND MIXED JURISDICTIONS  803 
(A.M. Rabello ed. 1997); Verhagen, supra note 27, at 477. 
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last scenario is that neither the settlor, trustee, or beneficiary really owns 
trust assets, but the trustee has to manage the assets in the interest of the 
beneficiary. The Civil Code of Québec is a typical example of this 
approach,29 as are the trust laws in Uruguay and the Czech Republic.30 
China seems to present a fifth scenario because the title locus of 
trust assets is quite ambiguous upon reading Article 2 of the Trust Law, 
which states that: 
[B]ased on his faith in trustee, entrusts his property rights to 
the trustee and allows the trustee to, according to the will of 
the settler and in the name of the trustee, administer or dispose 
of such property in the interest of a beneficiary or for any 
intended purposes.31 
According to this definition, although the trustee has the right to 
manage and dispose of trust assets, whether the trustee has the 
ownership completely depends on the legal meaning of the word 
“entrust (weituo, 委托),” which is unfortunately not further clarified in 
the Trust Law.32 
The ambiguity has led to lengthy debates. Scholars hold various 
views, among which the two dominant propositions are the settlor-
owned model and the trustee-owned model.33 Some scholars opine that 
 
 29. In Québec, a trust results from an act whereby “a person, the settlor, transfers property 
from his patrimony to another patrimony constituted by him which he appropriates to a particular 
purpose and which a trustee undertakes, by his acceptance, to hold and administer.” Meanwhile, 
the trust patrimony is “autonomous and distinct from that of the settlor, trustee or beneficiary and 
in which none of them has any real right.” See Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, arts. 1260-
61 (Can.). 
 30. Hofri, supra note 19, at 143. 
 31. Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note 18, art. 2 (emphasis added).  
 32. Charles Zhen Qu, The Doctrinal Basis of the Trust Principles in China’s Trust Law, 38 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 345, 356-57 (2003). 
 33. Beside the two mainstream views, Chinese scholars also have other views regarding the 
title locus of trust assets. However, these views are problematic and lack persuasiveness. See 
Shiyang Wen and Xingjun Feng, Lun Xintuo Caichan Suoyouquan, Qian Lun Woguo Lifa de 
Wanshan [The Ownership of Trust Assets and the Improvement of Relevant Legislations in 
China], 58(2) WUHAN U. J. 203 (Phil. & Soc. Sci. ed. 2005) (China) (arguing that the beneficiary 
has the ownership of trust assets in China); Guanzhi Hu and Qing Chen, Quanneng Fenge: Lun 
Woguo ‘Xintuofa’ zhi Xintuo Caichan Suoyouquan [Divided Right: An Analysis of the Ownership 
of Trust Assets in China’s Trust Law], 39(6) J. ZHENGZHOU U. 84 (2006) (China) (arguing the 
ownership can be divided into three parts and the settlor, beneficiary and trustee own a part 
respectively); Zhiyong Fan, Lun Xintuo Caichanquan de Guishu: Xintuo Caichan Gongyouquan 
de Guojian [The Title Locus of Trust Assets: Constituting the Right of Common of Trust Assets], 
12(1) J. SOUTHWEST JIAOTONG U. 107 (Soc. Sci. ed. 2011) (China) (arguing the trust assets are 
jointly owned by the settlor and the trustee); Pu Chen, Zuowei Suoyouquan Yundong Xingshi de 
Xintuo [Trust as the Movement of Ownership], 28(12) HEBEI L. SCI. 86 (2010) (China) (arguing 
that the settlor shall transfer the ownership to the trustee in normal situations and the ownership 
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the settlor reserves the ownership of trust assets.34 Although the 
definition of “entrust” is not directly defined in either the Trust Law or 
in any other Chinese legislations, there are some analogous institutions 
that may shed some light on the meaning of the word “entrust.” The 
General Principle of the Civil Law (hereinafter “GPCL”), which 
codifies general rules of civil law and serves as the foundation of 
specific civilian laws in China, prescribes “entrusted agency,” which 
means that an agent performs civil juristic acts in the principal’s name 
within the discretion entrusted by that principal.35 The Contract Law 
also incorporates Articles on “entrustment contract,” which is “a 
contract whereby the principal and the agent agree that the agent shall 
handle the affairs of the principal.”36 Neither the GPCL nor the Contract 
Law compulsorily requires the transfer of the property ownership from 
the principal to the agent.37 It has been widely recognized that the 
ownership is nevertheless vested in the principal.38 In analogy, Zhang 
affirms that the settlor still owns the trust assets.39 In addition, the 
settlor’s position as the ultimate owner can also be inferred from Article 
20 of the Trust Law, which states that the settlor has a right to not only 
know the administration of “her (qi, 其)” trust assets, but to also have 
access to her trust accounts and other relevant documents concerning 
“her (qi, 其)” trust assets.40 Therefore, the settlor, as stated by Article 
20, literally still owns the trust assets. 
Despite that, more scholars apparently support the trustee-owned 
 
turns back to the settlor if the trustee breaches the trust instrument). 
 34. HO, TRUST LAW IN CHINA, supra note 25, at 41; Chun Zhang, Xintuo Caichan Dulixing 
de Fali [The Legal Philosophy of the Independence of Trust Assets], 3 J. SOC. SCI. 102, 109 
(2011) (China). 
 35. Minfa Tongze (民法通则) [General Principles of the Civil Law], (promulgated by the 
President of the People’s Republic of China, Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 64 
[hereinafter China GPCL]. 
 36. Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the People’s Republic 
of China, Mar. 15, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), art. 396 [hereinafter Contract Law of China]. 
 37. See generally the GPCL and Contract Law.  
 38. See F.M.B. REYNOLDS ET AL., BOWSTEAD AND REYNOLDS ON AGENCY 23 (18th ed. 
2006); G.H.L. FRIDMAN, THE LAW OF AGENCY 24 (7th ed. 1996).  
 39. Chun Zhang, Zhongguo Xintuofa de Chuangzaoxing Guiding jiqi Pingxi [The Innovative 
Legislations in China’s Trust Law and the Analyses], 2 LEGAL SCI. 110, 112 (2002) (China). 
 40. Article 20 of the Trust Law reads: “The settler shall have the right to know the 
administration, use and disposition of, and the income and expenses relating to, his trust property, 
and the right to request the trustee to give explanations in this regard. The settler shall have the 
right to check, transcribe or duplicate the trust accounts related to his trust property and other 
documents drawn up in the course of dealing with trust business.” Trust Law 2001 (China), supra 
note 18, at art. 20.  
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model interpretation.41 Several articles in the Trust Law suggest that 
trust assets are vested in the trustee. For instance, Qu argues that a 
reading of how the word “obtain (qude, 取得)” is used in Article 14 of 
the Trust Law supports the trustee as the owner.42 Reid supplements this 
argument with another piece of evidence.43  His argument goes as 
follows: Article 52 provides that the trust shall not be terminated by the 
death, incapacity, or bankruptcy of the settlor or trustee and, according 
to Articles 15 and 16, the trust assets do not fall into their legacies or 
bankruptcy estates.44 In that case, a new trustee will take the place of the 
original trustee.45 It is unclear, however, who would replace the settlor 
in the same scenario. If the settlor were to be the owner of the trust 
assets, then those trust assets would be ownerless because no one would 
succeed the settlor. These Articles, when read together, imply no 
ownership title held by the settlor. 
Aside from the reasoning on the basis of legal provisions, 
proponents further support the trustee’s ownership theory by appealing 
to functional justifications. Like most civilian jurisdictions, China uses 
trust “not out of intellectual curiosity but . . . to cater to [the] investment 
and commercial utilization of assets.”46 In commercial fields, investors 
give assets to fund managers on the belief that professional skills and 
the sophistication of fund managers can create higher investment 
returns. The fact that the trustee is not treated as the owner may lower 
efficiency and flexibility of the trust scheme, particularly when the 
trustee’s status as owner may be conducive to exclude improper 
interventions from the settlor during its management.47 Moreover, if the 
trustee has no prima facie ownership of trust assets vis-à-vis the outside 
world, there may be tiresome burdens on her to prove her authority to 
 
 41. See Charles Zhen Qu, The Doctrinal Basis of the Trust Principles in China’s Trust Law, 
38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 345, 356-58 (2003); Yu Haiyong, Lun Xintuo Caichan de 
Suoyouquan [On the Ownership of Trust Property], 50 J. SUN YAT-SEN U. 189, 200 (Soc. Sci. ed. 
2010) (China); Linqing Jia, Xintuo Caichanquan de Falu Xingzhi He Jiegou Zhi Wojian [The 
Legal Nature and Structure of the Right of Trust Assets], 5 JURIST 81, 90 (2005) (China). 
 42. Id. at 357. Article 14 of the Trust Law says “the property obtained by the trustee due to 
a trust accepted is trust property.” Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note18, at 14 (emphasis added). 
 43. See generally Kenneth G.C. Reid, Conceptualizing the Chinese Trust: Some Thoughts 
from Europe, in TOWARDS A CHINESE CIVIL CODE: COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 219 (Lei Chen & C.H. van Rhee eds., 2012) [hereinafter Reid, Conceptualizing]. 
 44. Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note 18, at arts. 15, 16, 52.  
 45. Article 40 of the Trust Law says “Where the trustee’s appointment is terminated, a new 
trustee shall be appointed . . . The new trustee shall take up the rights and obligations of the 
former trustee in the handling of trust business.” Id. art. 40. 
 46. Qu, supra note 32, at 348. 
 47. HO, TRUST LAW IN CHINA, supra note 24, at 38. 
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manage the trust assets to the satisfaction of third parties.48 
China is one of very few jurisdictions with an unclear locus of, or a 
“shapeless,” title to trust assets.49 This, however, was not the case in the 
First and Second Trust Bill, which were both drafted by a committee of 
mostly law professors. This committee followed the hegemonic trustee-
ownership model by imposing a duty on the settlor to transfer the 
ownership of trust assets to the trustee.50 The indeterminate ownership 
model in the Trust Law in force was a final amendment made by 
politicians who were the ultimate decision makers.51 
There are several considerations behind the amendment. First, the 
politicians conjectured that it was very hard for Chinese people to 
understand or accept the trust institution if the settlor lost the ownership 
of trust assets completely.52 The indeterminate ownership model, by 
which the settlor may reserve the ownership, was supposed to be more 
acceptable to potential settlors unaccustomed to it.53 Second, Chinese 
people lacked faith in granting the full ownership to trust companies 
because they had the weakest status and experience amongst other 
financial institutions.54 The settlor as owner of trust assets can, to some 
 
 48. Lusina Ho, The Reception of Trust in Asia: Emerging Asian Principles of Trust?, 2004 
SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 295-96 (2004) [hereinafter Ho, The Reception of Trust in Asia]. 
 49. Lupoi argues that the Hague Convention on the Recognition of Trusts is also shapeless 
because it allows a trust to exist even if the settlor is still regarded as the owner of trust assets. See 
MAURIZIO LUPOI, TRUSTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 327-41 (Simon Dix trans.) (2000) 
[hereinafter LUPOI, TRUSTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY]. Article 2 of the Convention defines a 
trust as “relationships created . . . by . . . the settlor, when assets have been placed under the 
control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or for a specified purpose.” Nonetheless, the 
Convention intentionally drafts the definition of trust in a broad way in order to promote the 
recognition of trust in civil law jurisdictions and attract more signed members. The jurisdiction-
neutral Convention merely provides a minimal requirement, but for jurisdictions which have 
signed or borrowed the Convention, the ownership of trust property has to be clearly indicated. 
See Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note18, at art. 2. 
 50. See Article 3 of the ‘First Trust Bill’ and Article 3 of the ‘Second Trust Bill’, which 
have the same words: “For the purpose of this law, a trust is an action by which the settlor, based 
on his confidence on the trustee, transfers the ownership of his property  to the trustee . . .” 
DRAFTING MATERIALS COLLECTION OF CHINA’S TRUST LAW 529 and 557 (Shaoping Zhu & Yi 
Ge, eds., 2002) (emphasis added) [hereinafter “The First & Second Trust Bill”].  
 51. See Rongtao Yan, Zhongguo Xintuo Caichan Suoyouquan Guishu Fenxi yu Goujian 
[Analysis and Reconstruction on the Internal Structure of Trust Ownership in China], 9(9) J. 
KUNMING U. 60, 62 (Sci & Tech ed. 2009) (China). 
 52. Id. 
 53. This is a common consideration for jurisdictions with the shapeless feature. See Hofri, 
supra note 19, at 175-76. 
 54. See Lusina Ho, Trust Laws in China: History, Ambiguity and Beneficiary’s Rights, in 
RE-IMAGING THE TRUST: TRUSTS IN CIVIL LAW 201-02 (Lionel Smith ed. 2012) [hereinafter Ho, 
Trust Laws in China: History]. 
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extent, act as a check and balance of the trustee’s management.55 Third, 
the amendment was said to be beneficial in protecting state assets that 
were invested overseas in the name of private companies and managed 
by private companies.56 This way, even if these companies had 
misappropriated state assets or had become insolvent, the original 
grantors can attach the state assets to the name of the settlors who, 
according to China’s Trust Law, would be the owners.57 
 These conjectures proved to be wrong in later practice. On the one 
hand, the indeterminate ownership approach is unable to effectively 
protect overseas state assets. Even if a Chinese court decides that the 
state assets located in foreign countries are still owned by the settlor, it 
is difficult to get such a decision recognized and enforced by foreign 
courts.58 On the other hand, the indeterminate ownership aggravates 
uncertainty and makes trusts harder to understand, even specialists like 
judges have opposite verdicts regarding similar fact. For example, one 
court held that the trustee was the owner of trust assets in Shandong 
Food v Jinan Yingda Trust while another held that the settlor owned the 
trust assets in Beijing Haidian v Shenzhen Xinhua.59 The design of 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. According to Chinese socialism ideology, state assets owned by state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in appearance are owned by all Chinese people in theory. When these SOEs make 
overseas investments, the status as SOE may raise concerns such as sovereign immunity and 
underlying state guarantee, which to some extent not only cause adverse impacts on SOEs but 
also disrupt the level playing field of overseas jurisdictions. Therefore, the status as SOE is not 
very welcome by laissez-faire markets. In response, Chinese SOEs usually transfer state assets to 
private companies they incorporate in host markets or to individuals they designate for 
investments.   
 57. Wei Qin,  Xintuofa: Qinian Fengyujiancheng, Weilai Renzhongdaoyuan [Trust Law: the 
Impediments over Last Seven Years and the Rocky Path to the Future], JRJ, 
http://trust.jrj.com.cn/2008/10/000004040213.shtml (last updated Oct. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Qin, 
Trust Law: the Impediments]; Wang, The History and Development of PRC’s Trust Law (Part I), 
supra note 17, at 6. 
 58. Qin, Trust Law: the Impediments, supra note 57 (“At that time, people attach great 
importance for the phenomenon of loss of state assets abroad . . . we often cannot successfully 
recover the loss of state assets  . . .introducing trust system can better protect the safety of state 
assets.”). 
 59. Shandong Province Food Co. v. Jinan Yingda Guoji Trust Investment Co., (Second 
Instance, Jinan Interm. People’s Ct., Apr. 14 2002) (China) (finding that a contract, by which the 
appellee (food company) deposited monies in an account of the appellant (trust company) and 
entrusted the appellant to make loans in the interest of the appellee, was a trust contract rather 
than an entrusted contract, and holding that the trustee owns the ownership of trust assets).  
Beijing Haidian Technology Development Co. v. Shenzhen Xinhua Jinyuan Investment Co. et al. 
(First Instance, Chongqing Higher People’s Court, Mar. 19 2007) (China) (finding that a contract, 
by which the Haidian Technology entrusted monies to the Xinhua Trust and the Xinhua Trust 
bought shares and managed shares for the benefit of the Haidian Technology, was a trust contract, 
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indeterminate ownership was expected to be more acceptable for the 
public, but ironically the result is the opposite. As Gao asserts, no 
private trusts, such as private living or testamentary trusts, have been set 
up by Chinese people.60 
Moreover, the ambiguity of ownership creates an unintended 
loophole in the Trust Law. Pursuant to Article 8, a trust is established 
when contractual parties sign the contract in express writing, and the 
transfer of the ownership of trust assets is not a co-condition.61 This 
Article works well when the settlor continues to be the owner of trust 
assets, but it may be troublesome when the trustee is the owner 
according to the contract. In the latter case, the transfer of ownership is 
merely a contractual obligation borne by the settlor after the 
establishment of contract rather than a precondition to bring the contract 
into effect.62 Therefore, it is possible that the settlor breaches her duty 
and transfers the ownership of trust assets to a third party.63 
III. THE SETTLOR’S EXTENSIVE RIGHTS 
In common law, once the settlor has unilaterally transferred trust 
assets to the trustee, she completely drops out of the picture and the 
trustee only owes duties to the beneficiary unless the settlor is a 
beneficiary concurrently or reserves some rights against the trustee in 
the trust instrument.64 The rationale is that, because legal title to trust 
assets has been vested in the trustee and the beneficiary enjoys the trust 
benefit, the settlor has no more interests in the trust assets.65 Generally, 
 
and holding the settlor owns the title of trust assets). 
 60. LINGYUN GAO, BEI WU DU DE XIN TUO [THE MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE TRUST] 241 
(2010) [hereinafter GAO, BEI WU DU DE XIN TUO]. 
 61. Article 8 of the Trust Law reads: “The trust shall take the form of writing . . . Where a 
trust is created in the form of trust contract, the trust shall be deemed created when the said 
contract is signed.” See Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note 40, at art. 8. This Article provides 
that a trust could also be established by other written documents stipulated by laws and 
administrative regulations, but no laws or administrative regulations have prescribed other written 
documents to date. Therefore, the contract in writing continues to be the sole way to constitute a 
non-testamentary trust in China.  See id.  
 62. Reid, Conceptualizing, supra note 43, at 218-19 (explaining that “whether a transfer 
takes place, therefore, would seem to depend on the terms of the trust contract, or . . . on the 
decision of the settlor.”). 
 63. Id. at 219. 
 64. Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts [1952] Ch. 534, 542; Bradshaw v University College of 
Wales [1987] 3 All E.R. 200 at 203; HAYTON ET AL., supra note 2, at 2, 4 (stating the settlor in 
exceptional cases may act “as the donee of a power of appointment over capital” or “as a 
protector . . . of beneficiaries that are as yet unborn or unascertained”). 
 65. Qu, supra note 32, at 366. 
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if the settlor reserves too many rights to monitor or even intervene in the 
management of trust assets, she “risks being considered by the court as 
not having fully relinquished ownership” over her assets, which 
frustrates the trust objective.66 In striking contrast, the settlor in China is 
overwhelmingly empowered with five categories of rights by China’s 
Trust Law: 
right of information;67 
right of intervention and revocation;68 
right of appointment and dismissal;69 
right of consent;70 and 
right to obtain residual value of trust assets.71 
In common law, the settlor may reserve these powers in the trust 
instrument by specific clauses,72 but these rights become default for the 
settlor in China.73 Compared with other trust-reception civilian 
 
 66. HO, TRUST LAW IN CHINA, supra note 24, at 112. 
 67. The settlor has the right to know administrative affairs and to check the trust account and 
other correlative documents. See Article 20 of Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note 18. The 
trustee should report management progress and present documents to the settlor. See id. art. 33. 
 68. If the settlor believes the trustee’s administration method is not favorable to the trust 
objective or to the beneficiary’s interest, she has the right to unilaterally adjust that method. See 
id. art. 21. If the trustee breaches duties of administration or causes losses to trust assets, the 
settlor can set aside the trustee’s activity and ask for restitution and compensation with the aid of 
a court. See id. art. 22. If the beneficiary commits a serious tort against the settlor or other co-
beneficiaries, the settlor can deprive the beneficiary’s right or even revoke the trust. See id. art. 
51. 
 69. If the trustee has gross negligence in the course of administration, the settlor has the 
right to dismiss, or apply to the court to dismiss, the trustee. See id. art. 23. In the absence of 
otherwise provisions in the trust instrument, the settlor may appoint a new trustee when the term 
of the previous trustee expires. See id. art. 40.  
 70. The settlor may give consent to a self-dealing transaction conducted by the trustee at fair 
and open market price, the trustee’s remuneration, the trustee’s resignation, the termination of 
trust, and the settlement of dissident trustees who handle the trust affairs jointly. See id. arts. 28, 
35, 38, 41, and 53(4). 
 71. The settlor has right to obtain residual value of trust assets after the beneficiary and her 
successors when the trust is terminated. See id. art. 54.  
 72. E.g., pursuant to Trustee Act, 2000, c. 29, § 6(1)(b) (Eng.), the settlor may reserve a 
power in the trust instrument to give instructions to the trustee regarding the investment of the 
trust funds; Trustee Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 19, §36(1)(a) (Eng.) also provides that the 
power to appoint new trustees can be retained by the settlor in the trust instrument.  
 73. The Trust Law allows the trust instrument to alter some of settlor’s defaulting rights, 
such as the settlor’s right of consent with regard to the trustee’s remuneration and the settlement 
of dissident trustees who handle the trust affairs jointly, the settlor’s right to appoint a new trustee 
when the appointment of the previous trustee is terminated, and the settlor’s right in the residual 
interest of trust assets. See Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note18, arts. 31, 35, 40, 54. However, 
it is unclear whether the trust instrument can exclude the other powers. 
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jurisdictions, the settlor in China is far more powerful in some aspects. 
For example, as to the second category—right of intervention and 
revocation, the settlor may intervene into the trust management by 
unilaterally adjusting the method of administration.74 This right puts the 
settlor in a very powerful position. When the trust is created by a 
contract, contract clauses can only be amended with the consent of both 
contractual parties, it cannot be amended by one party alone.75 In 
civilian jurisdictions like Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, whose trust 
laws are heavily drawn upon by Chinese legislatures, settlors can only 
change the method of trust administration by applying to the courts.76 
Some offshore jurisdictions have delegated extensive powers to the 
settlor like in China,77 but these jurisdictions use that to compete for 
trust business.78 It is said that powers delegated to the settlor in offshore 
jurisdictions are generally fiduciary in nature, and the settlor is 
prohibited from derogating from her benefaction.79 However, no 
obligations, such as fiduciary duty and duty of care, are imposed on the 
settlor in China.80 As some scholars confirm, China’s Trust Law is very 
special to confer such extensive rights to the settlor.81 
Unlike the indeterminate ownership of trust assets, which was a 
last-minute amendment by politicians, the settlor’s status with extensive 
rights is an endogenous design by legislatures. Most of the settlor’s 
rights mentioned above have already existed in the First Trust Bill and 
 
 74. Id., art. 21. 
 75. Contract Law of China, supra note 36, at art. 77. 
 76. See Trust Law promulgated on Jan. 26, 1996; amended Dec. 30, 2009, art. 16 (Taiwan) 
(which states “[i]f the method of administration of a trust property is not in the beneficiary’s 
interest because of change in circumstances, the settlor, beneficiary or trustee may apply to the 
court for the change in the method.”). The similar stipulation can be found in Trust Act, Act. No. 
900, Dec. 30, 1996; amended Mar. 31, 2005, art. 36. (S. Kor.) and Trust Act, Act No. 108 of 
2006, art. 150 (Japan). 
 77. See, e.g., TRUSTS (JERSEY) LAW 1984, art. 9A, at 12, Trusts (Guernsey) Law, Cayman 
Island Trust Law, Bahamian Trustee Act, and San Marino Trust Law in infra note 18. 
 78. M.W. LAU, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRUSTS 32 (2011). 
 79. HO, TRUST LAW IN CHINA, supra note 24, at 113-14. 
 80. The Trust Law imposes the duty of care and fiduciary duty on the trustee only. “The 
trustee shall abide by the provisions in the trust document, and administer the trust affairs for the 
best interests of the beneficiary. The trustee shall perform his duties zealously as well as the 
obligations with honesty, good faith, care and efficiency.” See Trust Law 2001 (China), supra 
note 18, at 25. However, none of articles of the Trust Law imposes equivalent duties on the 
settlor. 
 81. QING WANG & CE GUO, ZHONGGUO XINTUOFA TIAOWEN QUANSHI [THE ANNOTATION 
TO ARTICLES OF CHINA’S TRUST LAW] 56, 64 (2001) [hereinafter WANG & GUO]; RUIDONG 
ZHONG & XIANGCONG CHEN, XIN TUO FA [TRUST LAW] 91 (2004) [hereinafter ZHONG & 
CHEN].  
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the Second Trust Bill, though the ultimate Trust Law confers some 
additional rights.82 There are two reasons for this characteristic, one of 
which legal, and the other political. In the common law trust, the settlor 
creates a trust by either declaring herself as the trustee or declaring 
someone else as the trustee and effectively transferring trust assets to 
others.83 The settlor and the trustee have no rights against each other. On 
the contrary, Chinese trust other than the testamentary trust is set up by 
contract,84 so the privity of contract is in place. In a contract, one party 
owns rights and at the same time owes obligations to the counterparty 
and vice versa. As Lupoi asserts, it is “difficult to deprive one 
contracting party of the right to take action against the other,” so the 
settlor, being a party to the contract, certainly has the right to monitor 
and demand the proper performance of the contract by the 
counterparty—the trustee.85 
The political reason goes further than the legal reason. For Chinese 
legislatures, the very notion of cutting off the settler from her trust is 
perverse. As Zhong and Chen contend, “the trust relationship, after all, 
is established by the settlor.”86 It is reasonable to consistently enhance 
the settlor’s status in order to ensure the accomplishment of trust 
purpose and to safeguard the balance of rights between the settlor and 
the trustee.87 The legislatures believe no one is in a better position than 
the settlor to know whether the beneficiary’s rights, trust obligations, as 
well as the trust’s purpose have been conscientiously satisfied.88 This 
notion gives the trust creator the justification to monitor the trustee’s 
management activities and even power of enforcement in some 
circumstances.89 Moreover, like the political account in creating the 
indeterminate ownership model, the settlor’s superior position is 
intended to make the novel trust institution more acceptable to Chinese 
people. 
However, by enacting such an amendment, the legislatures 
overlook the basic function of trust, which is designed to benefit the 
beneficiary. First, the settlor herself has no evident interests in trust 
 
 82. See generally, The First & Second Trust Bill, supra note 50, at 185-212. 
 83. HAYTON ET.AL., supra note 2, at 206. 
 84. Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note 18, at art. 8.  
 85. LUPOI, TRUSTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 49, at 310-11. 
 86. ZHONG & CHEN, supra note 81, at 91. 
 87. WANG & GUO, supra note 81, at 54, 126. 
 88. Frances H. Foster, American Trust Law in a Chinese Mirror, 94 MINN. L. REV. 602, 
640-641 (2010).  
 89. Id. 
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assets. The settlor’s “interests” are in the interest of the beneficiary’s 
interests. Once the beneficiary’s interests are protected, the settlor’s 
“interests” are well served. Second, the beneficiary’s interests can be 
more efficiently protected by the beneficiary herself with the assistance 
of the court. The beneficiary knows better whether the interests due to 
her are properly distributed, and she has a stronger incentive to ensure 
the proper administration of trust assets.90 Third, the trustee is better 
placed than the settlor to judge how to administrate the trust. Nearly all 
Chinese trusts are currently commercial, so they require professional 
skills and sophistication on the trustee’s part. The settlor, usually a 
layman in investment, may have no more knowledge than the trustee. 
Arbitrary intervention by the settlor will likely undermine the trust’s 
purpose. Fourth, the settlor’s status with extensive rights generates an 
aberrant trust business in China—trust loans.91 Under this structure, a 
bank (acting as the settlor), in order to circumvent capital regulations, 
would transfer monies to a trust company (acting as the trustee), and the 
trust company would “manage” the monies by way of providing loans 
to enterprises, the original borrowers of the bank.92 In practice, however, 
the trust company only acts as a passive conduit and does not manage 
the monies at all. The bank itself has to conduct due diligence on the 
borrowers’ credit standing and monitor or even dominate the whole 
transaction. The settlor’s extensive rights empowered by the Trust Law 
make that possible.93 As Gao concerns, such practice, leaving the trustee 
in idle, obstructs the cultivation of a labor market of professional 
trustees in China.94 
IV. THE NATURE OF THE BENEFICIARY’S RIGHT 
As a civil law jurisdiction, China has a distinction between 
property and obligation. A property right or a right in rem refers to the 
right to directly dominate a given thing according to law, which consists 
 
 90. Qu, supra note 32, at 367. In exceptional cases, such as when the beneficiary is a child 
or incapable for other reasons, the beneficiary may be unaware of her interests in the trust and the 
trustee’s administration. 
 91. Because of the fiscal austerity policy since 2010, direct banking loans from banks to 
enterprises were controlled on a quota basis and so a lot of banking loans were disguised as 
uncontrolled trust loans. 
 92. JingJiang, Shadow banking in China: Battling the darkness, ECONOMIST, May 10, 2014. 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21601872-every-time-regulators-curb-
one-form-non-bank-lending-another-begins. 
 93. This point is attributable to Professor Charlie Weng, who commented on this paper in 
the Conference “The Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics” on 6 June 2013. 
 94. GAO, BEI WU DU DE XIN TUO, supra note 60, at 100. 
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of the right of ownership, the usufruct, and the security interest on 
property.”95 It is absolute against indeterminate persons in the world at 
large who have an implicit obligation not to infringe the right. An 
obligatory right or right in personam is based on the right of action, in 
which the counterparty can be demanded to fulfill her obligation as 
specified by the contract, other legal provisions (such as unjust 
enrichment),96 negotiorum gestio, or tort.97 Different from the right in 
rem, the right in personam merely imposes duties on determinate 
persons.98 The Trust Law does not explicitly indicate the attribution of 
beneficiary’s right, which causes debates in academia. 
Basically, there are two dominant views among scholars.99 The 
first view regards the beneficiary’s right as a right in rem. Li et al. think 
the beneficiary’s right has some proprietary attributes because it 
attaches not only to new assets the trustee gains in the course of 
management but also to unjust interests the trustee obtains for self-
interest.100 The argument of Li et al., based on the real subrogation 
nature of the beneficiary’s right, is backed by Xu, who further 
strengthens the notion by arguing that the beneficiary’s right to retrieve 
trust assets from a third party, empowered by Article 22 and Article 49 
 
 95. Property Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the People’s Republic 
of China, Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), art. 2 [hereinafter Property Law of China], 
available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471118.htm (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2015).   
 96. China GPCL, supra note 35, arts. 84-85. 
 97. Id. arts. 92, 93, 117. 
 98. Austin Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17(4) COLUM. L. REV. 
269, 273-74 (1917). 
 99. Besides the two dominant views, several scholars hold the third view: the beneficiary’s 
right is an independent right, different from the right in rem and the right in personam but 
compounding some of their attributes together.). See TANG YIHU, XIN TUO CAI CHAN QUAN LI 
YAN JIU [RESEARCH ON THE RIGHT OF TRUST ASSETS] 45 (Beijing Shi: Zhongguo zheng fa da 
xue chu ban she, Di 1 ban 2005). Although this view has a kind of novelty, not only does it lack 
strong doctrinal support, but also it blurs the cut-off line between the property and the obligation, 
which is the foundation of the legal architecture of civil law jurisdictions. See CHEN HUABIN, WU 
QUAN FA [FOREIGN PROPERTY LAW] 27 (Beijing Shi: Fa lu chu ban she, Di 1 ban 2004); Xu Wei, 
Xintuo Shouyiquan: Zhaiquan? Wuquan? Yihuo Xinquanli? [The Nature of the Beneficiary’s 
Right: A Property Right? An Obligatory Right? Or A New Right?], 30(5) J. ANHUI UNIV. (PHIL. 
& SOC. SCI. ED.) 64, 65 (2006). 
 100. Li Xiaotao, Nie Ying and Yuan Xiaodong, Xintuo Shouyiquan de Falu Xingzhi Tantao 
[Exploring the Legal Nature of the Beneficial Right], 4 SEC. MARKET HERALD 30, 32 (2012) 
(China). Article 14 of the Trust Law says: “The property obtained by the trustee through 
administering, using or disposing of the trust property or by other means falls within trust assets.” 
Article 26 of the Trust Law stipulates: “Where the trustee, in violation of the provisions of the 
preceding paragraph, seeks interests for himself by using the trust property, the interests gained 
therefrom shall be integrated into the trust property.” 
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of the Trust Law, is a property right.101 Lee, from a doctrinal 
perspective, suggests the classical understanding of ownership, 
including a bundle of rights, to be too stringent.102  She contends that the 
beneficiary has the right to enjoy from the trust and at the same time to 
exclude third parties’ intervention into her enjoyment, which are 
essentially proprietary elements and sufficient to constitute an 
ownership under the Chinese trust.103 
The second view is an opposite one. Li believes the beneficiary’s 
right is obligatory in nature because her right cannot be realized against 
the trust assets directly but has to rely on the performance of the 
trustee’s obligations.104 As a proponent of Li, Yuhua Zhou, who 
distinguishes the beneficiary’s right of retrieval in the Trust Law105 from 
the tracing process in a common law trust,106 opines that the former is an 
obligatory right against the trustee because it is designed by imitating 
the creditor’s right to rescind the debtor’s detrimental action in the 
Contract Law.107 Lai and Wang refute Li’s notion by stating that the 
 
 101. Xu Wei, Xintuo Shouyiquan de Falu Xingzhi Xintan [A New Review of the Attribute of 
the Trust Beneficial Right], 8(4) J. SHANGHAI UNIV. FIN. & ECON. 47, 49-50 (2006) (China); 
Chen Xueping, Xintuo Shouyiren Quanli de Xingzhi: Duirenquan yihuo Duiwuquan [The Nature 
of the Beneficiary’s Right: A Right in Personam or A Right in Rem], 146 J. COM. L. STUD. 73, 76-
77 (2011) (China) (supporting and complementing Xu’s argument). Article 22 of the Trust Law 
reads “If the trustee violates the purpose of the trust and disposes of the trust property, or handle 
the trust affairs improperly in violation of his administration duty, . . . the settlor has the right to 
apply to the court for setting aside such disposal, and has the right to request the trustee to restore 
the property to its original state or make compensation. If the transferee of the trust property 
knows of such violation but accepts the property, she shall return the property or make 
compensation. The right . . . shall be lost if the settlor does not exercise it within one year since 
she has come to know or should have known the reason for setting aside such disposal.” The 
beneficiary is conferred with the same rights by Article 49. 
 102. Rebecca Lee, Conceptualizing the Chinese Trust, 58 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 655, 666 
(2009) (arguing the standard incidents of ownership in civil law jurisdictions, including the right 
to possess, the right to use, the right to the benefits, etc., have been surpassed the necessary 
requirement for a common law trust). 
 103. Id. at 665-66 (arguing the standard incidents of ownership in civil law jurisdictions, 
including the right to possess, the right to use, the right to the benefits, etc., surpassed the 
necessary requirement for a common law trust). 
 104. LI XIHE, LUN FALU SHANG DE GUISHU [STUDY OF THE LEGAL ATTRIBUTION] 28 
(SIFA, Di 5 Ji, Di 1 Juan [5(1) Private Law] 2005). 
 105. For a fuller account of the beneficiary’s right of retrieval, see infra, notes 102-106 and 
accompanying context. 
 106.  Basically, in the common law trust, the tracing is a process that allows the beneficiary 
to trace and identify the trust assets transferred by the trustee who breaches the trust to a third 
party. Unless, however, the third party is a bona fide purchaser without notice of the breach and 
requests the court to restore the traced assets or their substitute to the trust. See PETTIT, supra 
note 3, at 551. 
 107. YUHUA ZHOU, XIN TUO FA XUE [TRUST LAW] 231 (2001); Article 74 of the Contract 
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beneficiary’s right does not contain all the attributes of a property right 
and so it is better to treat it as a right in personam under the Chinese 
legal system.108 
The first view is vulnerable. First, it conflicts with the principles of 
numerus clausus and indivisible ownership in the Chinese legal 
system.109 The numerus clausus principle is fleshed out in Article 5 of 
the Property Law, which states: “[t]he categories and contents of the 
property right shall be stipulated by law.”110 The property rights only 
have three types according to the Property Law: ownership, right of 
usufruct, and security interest.111 Notably, the beneficiary’s right is not 
any one of them, Trust Law also does not label it as a property right.112 
The principle of indivisible ownership used has the same meaning as 
dominium, meaning there is only one title vested in one property, and 
this title is not dividable. As previously clarified, either the settlor or the 
trustee has been the owner of trust assets pursuant to the Trust Law. If 
the beneficiary’s right is characterized as a property right or a right in 
rem, then there would be two owners of the same trust assets. This 
would be contrary to dominium (absolute ownership), which is a 
fundamental principle of the Property Law.113 
Second, Lee’s observation confuses the meaning of ownership in 
the common law context with that in the civil law context. The common 
law trust has a dual ownership structure, by which the trustee has a legal 
title to the trust assets prevailing against the whole world while the 
beneficiary holds an equitable title only prevailing against volunteers 
and those who have notice of the trust.114 The concept of equitable title 
 
Law of China (1999) stipulates: “If a debtor disclaims its due creditor’s rights or transfers gratis 
its property and thus causes losses to the creditor, the creditor may apply to a people’s court to 
rescind the debtor’s action. The creditor may also apply to a people’s court to rescind the debtor’s 
action if the debtor causes losses to the creditor by transferring its property at a low price 
evidently unreasonable and with awareness of the transferee.” 
 108. HEYUAN LAI & ZHICHENG WANG, XIAN DAI XIN TUO FA LUN [MODERN TRUST LAW] 
99 (2002). 
 109. For more details of  the principles of numerus clausus and indivisible ownership in civil 
law, see Avihay Dorfman, Property and Collective Undertaking: The Principle of Numerus 
Clausus, 61 U. TORONTO L. J. 467 (2011); Peter Birks, The Roman Law Concept of Dominium 
and the Idea of Absolute Ownership, ACTA JURIDICA 1 (1985).  
 110. Property Law of China, supra note 95, art 5.  
 111. See generally Property Law of China, particularlyarts. 39, 117, 170. 
 112. See generally, Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note 18.  
 113. See generally LIMING WANG, WU QUAN FA YAN JIU (SHANG JUAN) [PROPERTY LAW 
RESEARCH (VOLUME I)] 178-86 (3rd ed. 2013) [hereinafter WANG, PROPERTY LAW RESEARCH]. 
 114. HAYTON ET AL., supra note 2, at 74-75. 
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is different from the concept of ownership in China,115 which is the 
greatest possible interest in a thing and combines a cluster of rights that 
together amount to a monopoly over the thing.116 These rights include 
right to possess, right to use, right to benefit, right to alienate, right to 
exclude infringement, and right to create usufruct and security 
interest.117 Honoré states when the ownership is divided, as in the case 
of the trust that one person manages and another benefits, the monopoly 
no longer exists.118 The beneficiary’s right of enjoyment and right of 
exclusion may constitute the equitable title in the common law trust, but 
it is too aggressive to treat these rights as ownership under the Chinese 
law. 
Third, Xu’s opinion regarding the beneficiary’s right of retrieval is 
problematic. China’s Property Law stipulates the right to retrieve 
property, by which no matter how the property is transferred and who 
the prima facie transferee is, the original owner can reclaim the property 
and that the transferee shall return the property unless she pays value in 
good faith.119 However, the beneficiary’s right of retrieval in the Trust 
Law is different in three scenarios.120 First, it has to be implemented 
with the aid of court, which is not necessary for the right of retrieval in 
the Property Law.121 Second, the Trust Law does not stipulate whether 
the trust assets in the possession of the transferee are segregated from 
the transferee’s private assets. If the transferee goes bankrupt, the 
beneficiary will be an unsecured creditor and rank after other creditors 
with priority in partition of the bankruptcy estate.122 Third, the 
beneficiary’s right of retrieval vanishes after one year since she knows 
or should have known about the transfer.123 It is apparently inconsistent 
with the counterpart in the Property Law, where no time limitation is 
imposed. The beneficiary’s right of retrieval is designed more like a 
remedial right in the Contract Law where the obligee normally has one 
year to set aside improper behavior of the obligor.124 In conclusion, it is 
 
 115. Chen, supra note 33, at 88. 
 116. See generally WANG, PROPERTY LAW RESEARCH, supra note 113, at 393-97. 
 117. Property Law of China, supra note 95, at arts. 4, 39, 40. 
 118. Tony Honoré, Trusts: The Inessentials, in RATIONALIZING PROPERTY, EQUITY AND 
TRUSTS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EDWARD BURN 10 (Joshua Getzler ed. 2003) [hereinafter 
Honoré, Trusts: The Inessentials]. 
 119. Property Law of China, supra note 95, arts. 34, 106. 
 120. The beneficiary’s right of retrieval is stipulated in Article 22 of the Trust Law. 
 121. Property Law of China, supra note 95, art. 106. 
 122. HO, TRUST LAW IN CHINA, supra note 24, at 175-76. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Contract Law of China, surpra note 36, at arts. 55, 75, 192. 
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vulnerable to deem the beneficiary’s right of retrieval as the right in 
rem. 
It appears that the main intention of some scholars to interpret the 
beneficiary’s right as the right in rem is not to sweep away impediments 
in practice. One reason is that creating a dual ownership architecture 
neatly aligns with the orthodox common law trust. As Lawson remarks, 
the greatest difficulty of transplantation is “an English peculiarity 
logically detachable from the trust, namely, the distinction between the 
legal and the equitable estate.”125 The other reason is that the 
beneficiary’s right to exclude third parties and to retrieve trust assets 
could be justified under the theory of the right being in rem. These 
justifications, however, are questionable. 
On the one hand, dual ownership is a historical result of several 
centuries’ evolution of the trust institution rather than a necessary 
precondition for introducing the trust institution. Although the 
prevailing view treats the beneficiary’s right as the right in rem,126 this 
view has not been invariable throughout the trust’s historical 
development. In its infant stage, common law courts viewed the trustee 
as the legal owner of trust assets.127 The trustee bound herself to hold the 
assets for the beneficiary, whose right wholly depended on the 
conscientious performance by the trustee.128 In order to protect the 
beneficiary’s right, the equity court, as the spokesman of the King’s 
conscience, considered it unconscionable for the trustee to ignore her 
self-binding obligations.129 Therefore, it segregated the trust assets from 
the trustee’s personal assets and delegated the beneficiary correlative 
rights and remedies against the trustee.130 Equity did not stop here but 
extended the beneficiary’s right to external parties.131 First of all, the 
heir and doweress of the trustee were regarded as sustaining the 
trustee’s persona and thus bounded to continually perform the trustee’s 
obligation to the beneficiary.132 The next step was to put the trust assets 
out of the reach of the trustee’s creditors, though it had been more 
difficult to establish this rule.133 After this, the beneficiary was able to 
 
 125. F. H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 201 (1953). 
 126. Scott, supra note 98, at 289-90.  
 127. MAITLAND ET AL., supra note 4, at 111-12. 
 128. Id. at 112. 
 129. Id. at 29. 
 130. See generally id. at 23-42. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 40-41. 
 133. See generally id., at 23-42. 
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enforce its right against a volunteer who came to the assets through or 
under the trustee.134 Finally, equity confirmed the beneficiary’s right 
against the transferee who acquired the trust assets in bad faith.135 
However, equity did not touch upon a bona fide transferee who 
purchased the trust assets for value without notice of the trust. 
Consequently, the evolution of trust makes the beneficiary’s right have 
a misleading resemblance to a right in rem, but essentially it is a jus in 
personam.136 Common law creates the trust not by changing the concept 
of property or any decision to split ownership into legal and equitable 
titles but by an enormous and gradual expansion of obligations.137 
Milson asserts that “equity has proved that from the materials of 
obligation you can counterfeit the phenomena of property.”138 The dual 
ownership is just a conceptual façade and therefore, as Honoré and 
Lupoi confirm, the transplantation of trust should not be hampered due 
to lack of dual ownership tradition in civil law jurisdictions.139 
On the other hand, although pursuant to the Trust Law, tracing is 
not available to the beneficiary, and the transferee of trust assets cannot 
become a constructive trustee as the common law counterpart,140 there 
are alternative remedies in other Chinese laws. One available remedy is 
unjust enrichment, by which if assets are acquired improperly and 
without a lawful basis and result in another person’s loss, the assets 
shall be returned to the person who suffered the loss.141 Honoré argues 
 
 134. Id. at 39-41. 
 135. Id. at 112-17. 
 136. Id. at 107; Lionel Smith, Trust and Patrimony, 28 EST., TR, & PENSIONS J. 332, 343-44 
(2009) [hereinafter Smith, Trust and Patrimony]. 
 137. Lionel Smith, Transfers, in BREACH OF TRUST 213 (Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto eds., 
2002). Also see Neil Jones, Trusts in England after the Statute of Uses: A View from the 16th 
Century, in ITINERA FIDUCIAE: TRUST AND TREUHAND IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 173, 190 
(Richard Helmholz & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 1998) (stating that “[t]he creation of a trust is 
a process of cumulation, and not division [of titles]”). 
 138. STROUD F. C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 6 (2nd ed. 
1981). 
 139. Honoré, Trusts: The Inessentials, supra note 101, at 16 (stating that “[t]here is certainly 
a distinction between common law and equitable interests in property, but there is no need for a 
trust beneficiary to be given a proprietary interest in the trust assets.”); Maurizio Lupoi, The Civil 
Law Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 967, 970 (1999) (listing five elements of an appropriate 
definition of the trust in comparative terms, which do not include the dual ownership or the 
beneficiary’s right in rem). 
 140. In the common law trust, when the trust assets are wrongfully transferred to a third 
party, the third party is treated as a new trustee holding the assets in the interest of the 
beneficiary. However, this rule has some caveats. See HAYTON ET AL., supra note 2, at 541. 
 141. China GPCL, supra note 35, at art. 92. In addition, Lupoi argues that every civil activity 
is bound by a “far wider and more penetrating notion of good faith,” which can be a useful and 
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that the unjust enrichment can protect the beneficiary who “does not 
therefore possess, and need not be given, a real right in the trust 
assets.”142 
The second view, the beneficiary’s right as a right in personam, 
seems reasonable in China through foregoing analyses, but its two 
peculiarities certainly cannot be overlooked. The first is the “relative 
nature” of the beneficiary’s right against the trustee. As the theory of 
rights in civil law has shown, the obligatory right is not absolute against 
indeterminate persons in the world but still absolute against the 
determinate counterparty. The counterparty shall perform her 
obligations by use of all her assets, movable and immovable, present 
and future, unless she is incapable or goes bankrupt. Using a contract 
for the sale of goods as an example, the seller, after goods are delivered, 
can require the buyer to pay money out of all the cash and bank 
accounts the buyer owns until the debt is fully paid off. However, 
according to Article 34 of the Trust Law, “[t]he trustee shall have the 
obligation to pay the beneficiary [the] benefits from the trust with limits 
of the trust property,” and Article 16 says “[t]he trust property shall be 
segregated from the property owned by the trustee, and may not [be] 
included in, or made part of” the trustee’s own property.143 Both articles 
emphasize the segregation of trust assets and prohibit the beneficiary 
from claiming the trustee’s private assets, therefore, the beneficiary’s 
obligatory right is relative against the trustee. The beneficiary’s right is 
only absolute against the trustee within the spectrum of trust assets. 
The second peculiarity is called “bankruptcy remoteness.” If a 
debtor is bankrupt, the bankruptcy procedure first freezes the debtor’s 
business, including the performance of obligations.144 All the properties 
she owns become bankruptcy estate145 and her creditors cannot realize 
their interests unless they claim interests to the liquidator and wait for 
the distribution of liquidated assets. This asset distribution process is 
governed by the pari passu rule, where all debts rank equally, and all 
creditors are distributed in proportion to the size of their admitted 
 
flexible tool to protect the beneficiary. See Lupoi, The Civil Law Trust, supra note 139, at 971. 
 142. Honoré, Trusts: The Inessentials, supra note 118, at 20. 
 143. Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note 18, art. 14, 36.  
 144. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Pochan Fa (中华人民共和国企业破产法) 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the People’s 
Republic of China, Aug. 27, 2006, effective Jun. 1, 2007), art. 20 [hereinafter Bankruptcy Law of 
China]. 
 145. Id. art. 30. 
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claims.146 If debts have priorities, such as set-off, preferential debts, 
liquidation costs, employees’ salaries, and debts with securities,147 the 
obligatory right is subordinated until all prior claims have been fully 
paid off. The trustee declaring bankruptcy, however, does not affect the 
beneficiary’s right. Article 16 of the Trust Law provides that “[w]here 
the trustee dies or the trustee as a body corporate is dissolved, removed, 
or is declared bankrupt . . . the trust property shall not be deemed his 
legacy or liquidated property.”148 
V. CONCEPTUALIZING CHINA’S TRUST LAW 
China’s trust institution has three characteristics: the indeterminate 
title to trust assets, the settlor’s extensive rights, and the beneficiary’s 
right in personam with two peculiarities. In retrospect of the legislation 
of China’s Trust Law, the impediments on its rocky path are two-fold. 
On the one hand, the Trust Law is supposed to be designed for easy 
reception since it is a novel regime to the general public and most 
people have no recognition of the concept, functions, virtues, or vices of 
the trust. This reason was a major consideration of why politicians and 
legislators adopted the indeterminate ownership model and conferred 
such extensive powers to the settlor. On the other hand, the common 
law trust, as a result of such a model, is incompatible with the civil law 
system in China. The Trust Law has to deal with the technical feasibility 
of embedding the trust regime into the Chinese legal system without 
legal objections. The notion that the beneficiary’s right is a right in 
personam broadly accords with China’s legal architecture, particularly 
the principles of numerus clausus and indivisible ownership, though its 
two derivative peculiarities need more elaboration. 
These characteristics bring about many unintended debates, 
confusion in theory, and obstacles in practice. The amendment of the 
Trust Law is of course a direct and thorough way,149 but it is the last 
resort due to the difficulty and costliness to open amendment procedure. 
Even though the law will likely be revised, the conceptual foundation of 
the trust institution still needs clarification, especially the two 
peculiarities of the beneficiary’s right. As scholars point out, China’s 
 
 146. ROY GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 235 (4th ed. 2011). 
 147. See generally id. at 247-57. 
 148. Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note 18, art. 16. 
 149. As the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of China’s Trust Law, Wang said that the 
ambiguous ownership would be the first to be rectified in the future amendment of the Trust Law. 
See generally Qin, Trust Law: the Impediments, supra note 57. 
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Trust Law merely copies some articles, but the conceptual basis on 
which these articles are fleshed out is lacking.150 
A. Contract Theory 
Contract theory (well-recognized and well-established in China) 
has been heavily relied upon by legislatures to incorporate the common 
law trust in its laws. As mentioned, a Chinese trust takes effect 
depending on the effectiveness of its underlying contract rather than the 
transfer of trust assets. Currently, most trusts in China are business deals 
instead of gratuitous transfers like the traditional common law trust.151 
Therefore, it is near instinctual for those in China to reference to 
contract law when attempting to conceptualize trust law. Some scholars 
treat Chinese trusts as a form of entrusted agency, meaning that an agent 
performs civil juristic acts within the ambit authorized by the principal 
in an entrustment contract.152 Because the principal does not need to 
transfer the ownership of relevant assets to the agent in the entrusted 
agency,153 it comfortably fits the indeterminate ownership model. 
Moreover, the principal has extensive rights in the entrusted agency, 
similar to that of the settlor in a trust.154 For instance, the agent must 
“handle the entrusted affairs in accordance with the instructions of the 
principal,” and the instructions cannot be modified without the consent 
of the principal.155 
The similarities between the entrusted agency and trust only mean 
that “agents and trustees have something in common,” but that does 
“not necessarily mean that an agent is a trustee or that a trustee is an 
 
 150. Reid, Conceptualizing, supra note 43, at 212 (stating China’s Trust Law says what 
happen by presenting necessary rules but does not say why because “the concepts that must 
underpin them are often absent”); Lee, supra note 88, at 656 (stating “a conceptual framework is 
indispensable to the resolution of many trust issues and explanation of the core features of a 
Chinese trust”). 
 151. John Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 
107 YALE L. J. 165, 166-67 (1997) (advocating the contractarian basis of trust law on the ground 
that the traditional explanation of the trust bases on gratuitous transfers while most of trusts today 
are used in commercial fields, and the commercial trust is “the easiest case for the view that trusts 
are deals”). 
 152. China GPCL, supra note 35, at arts. 63-65; Contract Law of China, supra note 36, at art. 
396. 
 153. Lee, supra note 102, at 660. 
 154. Id.  
 155. Contract Law of China, supra note 36, at art. 399; see GAO FUPING, MING FA XUE 
[CIVIL LAW] 287-94 (Beijing: Fa Lu Chu Ban She, Di 2 ban [2nd ed.] 2009 [hereinafter GAO, 
MING FA XUE]. 
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agent.”156 They differ in some considerable aspects. First, the trustee 
acts in her own name157 rather than in the name of the principal as that in 
the entrusted agency.158 The trustee, as mentioned in previous sections, 
has initiative and discretion to manage trust assets subject to the trust 
instrument. An agent, on the contrary, has a less independent position 
because the agent’s behavior must strictly comply with the principal’s 
instructions.159 Second, the entrusted agency is terminated when the 
agent resigns or when the agent or the principal dies or goes bankrupt.160 
A trust is different in that it continues to exist in the scenarios where an 
agency relationship is terminated.161 Third, there is no segregation of the 
property in the entrusted agency even if the property is under the control 
of the agent. The agent must “hand over to the principal any property 
acquired in handling the entrusted affairs”162 whereas the trust assets are 
always segregated from the private assets of the settlor or of the 
trustee.163 Finally, the entrusted agency fails to explain non-self-benefit 
trusts. The entrusted agency is set up by a bilateral entrustment contract. 
164 If the agent was the trustee and the principal was the settlor, then who 
is the beneficiary in the entrustment contract? The principal here would 
also serve as the beneficiary because the agent handles entrusted affairs 
for the benefit of the principal. Put differently, the entrusted agency may 
only explain the self-benefit trust where the settlor is the beneficiary at 
the same time. 
In order to explain the non-self-benefit trust, a third-party-
beneficial contract (stipulatio alteri) is proposed, which refers to a 
trilateral contract established in favor of a third party who has not 
 
 156. RAPHAEL POWELL, LAW OF AGENCY 25 (2nd ed. 1961). 
 157. Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note 18, at art. 2. 
 158. In the GPCL, the agent must disclose that she acts in the name of the principal. 
However, the rule of agent identity disclosure is relaxed by the Contract Law, which on 
exceptional basis recognizes the effectiveness of the entrusted agency where the agent acts in her 
own name. See Contract Law of China, supra note 29, at arts. 402-03; GAO, MING FA XUE, supra 
note 155, at 229. 
 159. PETTIT, supra note 3, at 29. 
 160. China GPCL, supra note 35, at art. 69; Contract Law of China, supra note 36, at art. 
411. 
 161. Article 52 of the Trust Law stipulates: “A trust will not be terminated due to the facts 
that the settlor or trustee dies, loses his civil capacity for civil conduct, the trusteeship is dissolved 
or canceled according to law or he is declared bankrupt according to law, neither will it be 
terminated due to the fact that the trustee resigns.” 
 162. Contract Law of China, supra note 36, art. 404. 
 163. Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note 18, arts. 15-16. 
 164. Contract Law of China, supra note 36, art. 396. 
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assented but has been provided a legal right to enforce the contract.165 
Lawson points out that “the three-cornered relation [in a trust] . . . is 
easily explained in the modern law in terms of a contract for the benefit 
of a third party.”166 Langbein, comparing doctrines and functions of the 
trust with that of a third-party-beneficial contract, also concludes that 
the trust, a deal between the settlor and the trustee, is “functionally 
indistinguishable from the modern [day] third-party-beneficiary 
contract.”167 Under the third-party-beneficial contract, the creditor has 
rights to require the debtor to perform obligations on behalf of the third 
party, and so does the trust’s settlor. The debtor owes obligations to the 
third party, and the third party has rights but not obligations, just like 
the trustee and the beneficiary in a trust. Moreover, the third party only 
has a right in personam against the debtor, similar to the nature of the 
beneficiary’s right. 
There are, however, criticisms against this theory by many 
common law scholars.168 There are significant obstacles to it being used 
as a conceptual basis of Chinese trust. First, the legitimacy of the third-
party-beneficial contract is still controversial in China. The Contract 
Law describes a circumstance resembling the third-party-beneficial 
contract but is silent over the third party’s right of action against the 
debtor.169 It is therefore unclear whether the third party can demand the 
debtor’s performance directly and, in the case of non-performance, also 
claim damages.170 Second, the position of the third party is not identical 
 
 165. EWAN MCKENDRICK, CONTRACT LAW 175-76 (9th ed. 2011). 
 166. LAWSON, supra note 125, at 200. 
 167. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L. J. 625, 
627, 657-60 (1995) (arguing the trust and the third party beneficiary contract are the closest of 
substitutes). 
 168. LAU, supra note 78, at 21-35 (pointing out seven anatomical differences between trusts 
and contracts and arguing that Langbein’s account only address some of them, none of which is 
particularly satisfactory); David Hayton, The Distinctive Characteristics of the Trust in Anglo-
Saxon Law, King’s College London Teaching Material (2005) 1-8, 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/students/grad/llm/study/trust_law/resources/distinctive_characte
ristics_of_the_trust_paper1.pdf (last accessed on Nov. 1, 2013) (arguing that the concept of third-
party-beneficial contract misleads civil lawyers to consider the Anglo-Saxon trust as a glorified 
form of the third-party-beneficial contract). 
 169. Contract Law of China, supra note 36, art. 64 (“Where the parties agree that the debtor 
shall discharge the debts to a third party and where the debtor fails to do so . . ., the debtor shall 
bear the liability for breach of contract to the creditor.”). 
 170. BING LING, CONTRACT LAW IN CHINA 254 (2002) (arguing that the third party has right 
of action against the debtor for performance, but the third party cannot exercise certain remedies 
such as rescission or termination of contract); Liwei Guo and Xiaodong Liu, Hetongfa Yingdang 
Mingque Guiding Disanren Liyi Hetong [The Contract Law Should Expressly Stipulates the 
Third-Party-Beneficial Contract], 7(5) J. SOUTHWEST U. POL. & L. 121, 123-24 (2005) (arguing 
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to that of the beneficiary. The third party is like a donee, whose right 
under the contract is like a gratuitous gift from the obligee (donor). 
According to the Contract Law, the position of the donee is unstable and 
the protection on her right is quite weak because the obligee, the so-
called donor, may cancel the donation within her own determination 
prior to the transfer.171 On the contrary, the settlor cannot individually 
revoke the beneficiary’s right.172 Finally, this theory is unable to explain 
the indeterminate ownership of trust assets as well as the two 
peculiarities of the beneficiary’s right. 
In spite of notable doctrinal discrepancies between contract and 
trust, many Chinese judges have still discerned trust by virtue of 
contract, which has caused confusion of the two institutions in practice. 
In the case Shanghai Pubei v Qingtai Trust,173 the plaintiff (Shanghai 
Pubei) transferred funds to the defendant (Qingtai Trust) and entrusted 
the defendant to buy treasury bonds. According to their agreement, the 
plaintiff owned the funds, but the defendant could use them; treasury 
bonds were owned by the plaintiff but under the custody of the 
defendant.174 Apparently, an entrustment contract was created—the 
plaintiff was the principal while the defendant was the entrusted 
agency.175 The Shanghai No. 2 Intermediary Court appreciated this fact 
and made its decision by invoking the Contract Law and, astonishingly, 
the Trust Law as well. In another case, Huabao Trust v Shanghai 
Yanxin,176 the appellee (settlor/Shanghai Yanxin) transferred funds to 
the appellant (trustee/Huabao Trust) and required the trustee to buy and 
hold shares in the interest of the settlor (a self-benefit trust). When the 
settlor transferred her beneficial right on shares to a third party 
(Shanghai Zhizhen) without prior consent from the trustee, the trustee 
refused to alter the beneficiary of shares to the third party. The trustee 
 
the third party has no right of action against the debtor or the creditor according to current 
Contract Law). 
 171. Contract Law of China, supra note 36, at art. 186. 
 172. Unless the beneficiary commits a serious tort against the settlor or other co-beneficiaries, 
or the beneficiary so consents, the settlor cannot deprive the beneficiary’s right. See Trust Law 
2001 (China), supra note 18, at art. 51. 
 173. Shanghai Pu Bei Ranqi Youxian Gongsi v. Qing Tai Xintuo Touzi Youxian (上海浦北
燃氣有限公司v慶泰信託投資有限) [Shanghai Pubei Gas Co. v. Qingtai Trust Investment Co.], 
(Shanghai Interm. People’s Ct. Feb. 25, 2005). 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. 
 176. Hua Bao Xintuo Touzi Youxian Zeren v. Shanghai Yan Xin Shiye Touzi Youxian 
Gongsi (華寶信託投資有限責任v上海岩鑫實業投資有限公司) [Huabao Trust Investment Co. 
v. Shanghai Yanxin Shiye Investment Co.], (Shanghai High Ct. 2004). 
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argued that the transfer was not an assignment of the beneficiary’s right 
but a general assignment of all the rights and obligations of the settlor 
and beneficiary (the settlor is the beneficiary concurrently), so the 
transaction should be re-characterized as a novation of contractual party, 
which required consent of the contractual counterparty—the trustee.177 
Regrettably, the Shanghai High Court, applying the contract theory to 
explain the trust transaction, agreed with the trustee’s argument.178 
B. Special Patrimony Theory 
Patrimony is an old terminology potentially dating back to the 
ancient Roman law.179 The old patrimony theory deems a patrimony as a 
collection of a person’s assets: “each person has a patrimony, but only 
one; the patrimony is indivisible; and the patrimony cannot be 
transferred, inter vivos, as a whole.”180 The old patrimony theory, 
however, becomes unsatisfactory and even unworkable as the juristic 
doctrine evolves.181 The modern patrimony theory treats the patrimony 
as the totality of a person’s assets and liabilities.182 The patrimony looks 
 
 177. Id.  
 178. China’s Trust Law neither clarifies whether the settlor’s right is transferable nor 
indicates the replacement of settlor. Therefore, the Shanghai High Court opined that the status as 
settlor could be transferred because of no prohibition in the Trust Law. Actually, the Shanghai 
High Court misunderstood the trust institution. The settlor is the person who creates the trust, and 
her status cannot be changed. In common law, the settlor is generally out of the trust relationship 
once the trust is successfully constituted, and it is absurd that the settlor can transfer her rights 
and obligations to a third party. Because the Shanghai High Court comprehended the trust by 
virtue of doctrines of contract law, it wrongfully concluded that the settlor’s status and her rights 
and obligations could be transferred along with the transfer of beneficial interests on trust assets. 
In the above-mentioned case Beijing Haidian v Shenzhen Xinhua, the Chongqing High Court 
holds the same view with the Shanghai High Court. For a fuller commentary on Beijing Haidian, 
see generally Ho, Trust Laws in China: History, supra note 54, at 203-06.   
 179. George Gretton, Trusts without Equity, 49 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 599, 608-09 (2000) 
[hereinafter Gretton, Trusts without Equity]; Ross Anderson, Words and Concepts: Trust and 
Patrimony, in JUDGE AND JURIST: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF LORD RODGER 354 (Andrew 
Burrowers, David Johnston & Rein Zimmermann eds., 2013) (stating that “it is unlikely that the 
Romans ever worked out a consistent separation between individual assets – bona – and a 
university of individual assets: the whole patrimony . . . But the fundamentals [of patrimony] are 
there”). 
 180. Anderson, supra note 179, at 356 (summarizing the old patrimony theory formulated by 
Charles Aubry and Frederic-Charles Rau). 
 181. Id.; George Gretton, Up There in the Begriffshimmel, in THE WORLDS OF THE TRUST 
534 (Lionel Smith ed. 2013) (refuting the ‘one person, one patrimony’ doctrine by stating that it 
is “not a doctrine of the civil law tradition in general, but rather a doctrine developed for French 
law by Aubry and Rau in the nineteenth century”). 
 182. Kenneth Reid, Patrimony Not Equity: the Trust in Scotland, 3 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 
427, 432 (2000) [hereinafter Reid, Patrimony Not Equity]; Gretton, Trusts without Equity, supra 
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like a container that treats the liabilities and assets as a fluctuating 
whole unit; this way, the specific contents in the container are not 
treated separately and individually.183 Moreover, the modern patrimony 
theory acknowledges divisible patrimony in some circumstances where 
a person may own “both his own general or private patrimony and at the 
same time a special patrimony dedicated to some specific purpose.”184 
The two patrimonies are kept distinct by independent labeling and 
accounting. The assets of one patrimony cannot be transferred to the 
other.185 
French jurist Pierre Lepaulle was the first to use the theory of 
special patrimony (also known as “the theory of separate patrimony”) to 
interpret the common law trust in the civil law context.186 Lepaulle 
argued that the trust could be explained as a legal institution, consisting 
of a special patrimony “independent of any legal person, whose unity 
[was] defined by an appropriation.”187 Lepaulle’s statement raised two 
notions. First, the trust assets are separated from the general patrimony 
of the settlor and become a special patrimony (called “trust patrimony”). 
Second, the trust patrimony can be appropriated to a trust purpose with 
the result that it is not owned by any legal subject.188 Although 
Lepaulle’s explanation of trust may be wanting, his first notion has been 
influential in the civil law world. Mexico, as the pioneer, applied the 
special patrimony theory in drafting its trust statute in 1932.189 
Luxembourg recognized the special patrimony theory and took it as the 
conceptual basis of its transplanted trust regime in 2003,190 so were 
France in 2007,191 and Romania in 2011.192 The special patrimony theory 
 
note 179, at 608. 
 183. Smith, Trust and Patrimony, supra note 136, at 335. 
 184. Reid, Conceptualizing, supra note 43, at 225. 
 185. Reid, Patrimony Not Equity, supra note 182, at 432. 
 186. Ho, Trust Laws in China: History, supra note 54, at 1 (explaining that “The French jurist 
Pierre Lepaulle argued that the common law trust could be best understood, in civilian terms, as a 
patrimony by appropriation. This argument has been influential in some civilian receptions of the 
trust.”). 
 187. Smith, Trust and Patrimony, supra note 136, at 334. 
 188. Id. at 337. 
 189. Roberto Molina Pasquel, The Mexican Fideicomiso: The Reception, Evolution and 
Present Status of the Common Law Trust in a Civil Law Country, 8 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
54, 62-67 (1969). 
 190. Thibaut Partsch & Jeremie Houet, Article: Country Report: Luxembourg, 18 COLUM. J. 
EUR. L. ONLINE 55, 59 (2012). 
 191. The Law 2007-2011 in 19 February 2007 introduced the notion of “fiducie” and inserted 
it into Article 2011 of the French Civil Code (stating that in a fiducie a special patrimony is 
created which is not part of the settlor’s patrimony and does not form part of that of the trustee 
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is also recognized in Latin America.193 In spite of no domestic trust code 
in Italy, the Italian law has already used the special patrimony theory to 
perceive business trusts like securitization and pension funds.194 
Lepaulle’s second notion in fact answers the question of the title 
locus of the trust patrimony. Although the special patrimony as bona 
vacantia can be seen in some jurisdictions such as Québec,195 it has been 
widely accepted that it is better for the trustee to act as the owner of the 
special patrimony.196 If the special patrimony is ownerless, then many 
uncertainties may occur in practice, such as who will register the 
property, who will be taxed, who has locus standi to bring an action, 
and who can acquire the residual interests after the termination of trust. 
All these uncertainties require specific rules to clarify in the ownerless 
model, but that is not the case in the trustee-owned model, where the 
trust patrimony is vested in the trustee but also segregated from the 
general patrimony of the trustee. The beneficiary has an obligatory right 
against the trustee within the scope of the trust patrimony.197 The trust 
patrimony contains trust assets as well as liabilities, where trust assets 
are only answerable to trust liabilities.198 
The trustee-owned special patrimony is a native species in 
Scotland, a mixed jurisdiction with public traditions in its property 
law.199 This notion has also been followed by some model laws. The 
 
either). See Valerio Forti, Comparing American Trust and French Fiducie, 17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 
28-29 (2011). 
 192. Article 773 of the New Civil Code of Romania states “the fiducia is the legal operation 
whereby one or more grantors transfer various patrimonial rights or a group of such patrimonial 
rights, present or future, to one or more trustees, who administer those with a given purpose, to 
the benefit of one or more beneficiaries. These rights constitute an autonomous patrimony, 
separate from the other rights and obligations in the fiduciary’s own patrimony.” See Luminita 
Tuleasca, The Concept of the Trust in Romanian Law, 6(2) ROMANIAN ECON. & BUS. REV. 150, 
157 (2011); Codul Civil [Civil Code] art. 773. 
 193. Dante Figueroa, Civil Law Trusts in Latin America: Is the Lack of Trusts an Impediment 
for Expanding Business Opportunities in Latin America?, 24(3) ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 700, 
703-07 (2007). 
 194. James Koessler, Is There Room for the Trust in a Civil Law System? The French and 
Italian Perspective, 18 (March 2012), http://www.jameskoessler.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/Trust-in-Civil-Law.pdf. 
 195. Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, arts. 1260-61 (Can.). 
 196. Reid, Conceptualizing, supra note 43, at 229. 
 197. Magda Raczynska, Parallels between the Civilian Separate Patrimony, Real 
Subrogation and the Idea of Property in a Trust Fund, in THE WORLDS OF THE TRUST 480 
(Lionel Smith ed. 2013) (concluding that in civil law “a mere existence of a separate 
patrimony . . . is not sufficient to say that the beneficiary of such an arrangement has a proprietary 
right”). 
 198. Smith, Trust and Patrimony, supra note 136, at 341. 
 199. George Gretton, Trusts, in A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN SCOTLAND (VOLUME 1: 
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Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), which tries to provide 
common principles, definitions, and model rules of the European private 
law, drafts that “the trustee is the person in whom the trust fund 
becomes or remains vested,”200 and “the trust fund is to be regarded as a 
patrimony distinct from the personal patrimony of the trustee and any 
other patrimonies vested in or managed by the trustee.”201 The Draft of 
the EU Directive on Protective Funds, based on the Principles of 
European Law 1999, is very close to the DCFR regarding the trust 
definition. In the Draft Directive, “assets are owned by an administrator 
[i.e. trustee] for the benefit of one or more beneficiaries,”202 and “the 
assets of a protected fund form a patrimony separate from the private 
patrimony of the person who is administrator and from the patrimony of 
any other protected fund held by that person.”203 
The special patrimony theory, with increasing reception in the civil 
law world, certainly has remarkable values for China.204 Although none 
of articles in the Trust Law directly mention the special patrimony, the 
theory deserves close attention when conceptualizing China’s Trust 
Law.205 Indeed, the Trust Law can be reasonably conceptualized by this 
theory. First, many articles in the Trust Law illustrate the segregation of 
trust assets. The trust assets “shall be segregated from the property 
owned by the trustee”206 as well as non-trust properties owned by the 
 
INTRODUCTION AND PROPERTY) 480-517 (Kenneth Reid & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2000) 
(elaborating the origination and development of the unique trust institution in Scotland as well as 
influences from English law); M.J. de Waal & R.R.M. Paisley, Trusts, in MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS 
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: PROPERTY AND OBLIGATIONS IN SCOTLAND AND SOUTH 
AFRICA 839-42 (Reinhard Zimmermann, Daniel Visser & Kenneth Reid eds., 2004) (introducing 
the trustee-owned special patrimony regime in Scots law). 
 200. DCFR X. – 1:203: Parties to a trust (2). See PRINCIPLES DEFINITIONS & MODEL RULES 
OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME REFERENCE 502 (Christian von Bar et al. 
eds., 2009) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES DEFINITIONS & MODEL RULES ]. 
 201. Id.; DCFR X. – 1:202: Special legal effects of a trust (1). 
 202. Article 3.1, Draft EU Directive on Protected Funds. See TOWARDS AN EU DIRECTIVE 
ON PROTECTED FUNDS (S.C.J.J. Kortmann et al. eds., 2009), available at http://www.globalcoe-
waseda-law-commerce.org/activity/pdf/26/06.pdf (last visited on Nov. 1, 2013). 
 203. Article 3.2, Draft EU Directive on Protected Funds. 
 204. Some Chinese scholars have shown preliminary interest in the separate patrimony 
theory. See Yan, supra note 43, at 60-68; Qingchi Li, Zuowei Caituan de Xintuo: Bijiaofa shang 
de Kaocha he Fenxi [The Trust as Patrimony: Analyses from a Comparative Perspective], 43(4) 
J. PEKING U. 130 (Phil. & Soc. Sci. ed. 2006) 130 (China). 
 205. Reid, Conceptualizing, supra note 43, at 228-29 (arguing that the fact that the Trust Law 
does not clearly mention the special patrimony is not a sufficient reason to deny the patrimony 
theory). 
 206. Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note 18, art. 16; see also Xintuo Gongshi Guanli Banfa 
(信託公司管理辦法) [Measures for the Administration of Trust Companies] (promulgated by China 
Banking Regulatory Commission, Jan. 23, 2007, effective March 1, 2007) art. 3 [hereinafter 
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settlor.207 The trustee must administer the trust assets separately from 
her personal assets with separate accounting books.208 Correspondingly, 
the obligatory right, which occurs due to the trust administration, cannot 
be set off against the trustee’s private debts.209 The trustee is prohibited 
from appropriating the trust assets or commingling them into her 
personal assets.210 Without contrary provisions in the trust instrument or 
consent from the settlor or beneficiary, both the self-dealing between 
the trustee’s personal assets and the trust assets as well as the cross-
dealing between different trust assets managed under different trust 
schemes by the same trustee, are not allowed, the dealing is “conducted 
at fair market price.”211 At last, new assets obtained in the course of trust 
management, such as transaction considerations and investment 
revenues, are also trust assets.212 It works in concert with the doctrine of 
real subrogation in the patrimony theory—a new asset exchanged by the 
original asset in the patrimony still belongs to that patrimony.213 
Second, China’s Trust Law stipulates the segregation of trust 
liabilities. The trustee may incur debts both in her private life and in the 
course of trust management, so she has private creditors (due to private 
liabilities) and trust creditors (due to trust liabilities). In the common 
law, however, trust liabilities do not exist.214 The trustee is always 
personally liable for debts incurred in handling trust affairs. She pays 
trust creditors out of her personal assets and then has an equitable right 
to reimburse herself out of the trust assets. Unpaid trust creditors can 
only execute against the trustee’s equitable right of reimbursement, and 
they have no direct claim against the trust assets. 215 This principle, 
 
MATC]. 
 207. Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note 18, art. 15. 
 208. Id. art. 29. 
 209. Id. art. 18. 
 210. Id. art. 27; Article 26 of the Trust Law provides if the trustee violates the Law and 
“seeks for interests for himself by using the trust property, the interests gained therefrom shall be 
integrated in to the trust property.” 
 211. Id. art. 28. 
 212. Id. art. 14.  
 213. Gretton, Trusts without Equity, supra note 179, at 609-10. 
 214. See Lionel Smith, Mistaking the Trust, 40 HONG KONG L. J. 787, 797-98 (2010) 
(arguing the common law trust is “a way of holding property,” not liability and the trustee never 
holds liabilities in trust, only assets). 
 215. See Lionel Smith, Scottish Trusts in the Common Law, (Dec. 7, 2010) (Paper of the 2010 
W.A. Wilson Memorial Lecture) 6, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2241330 (forthcoming 
in 17(3) EDINBURGH L. REV. (2013)) [hereinafter Smith, Scottish Trusts in the Common Law] 
(explaining that “In the common law trust, the trustee is always personally liable for obligations 
incurred in the course of administration of the trust.”). 
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articulated in the leading case Jennings v Mather,216 can be paraphrased 
as that the common law trustee only has a segregation of assets (private 
assets and trust assets) but not liabilities (personal liabilities only).217 In 
contrast, China’s Trust Law separates both assets and liabilities. Trust 
assets are answerable to trust liabilities. When trust creditors require the 
trustee to fulfill her trust liabilities, they can request the court to execute 
the trust assets directly.218 If this direct execution right was not 
stipulated, then trust creditors may not receive sufficient protection 
under China’s Trust Law. Although trust creditors in China, as their 
common law counterparts, may indirectly realize their rights through 
the trustee’s reimbursement from the trust assets,219 the trustee will be 
divested the right of reimbursement when she commits a breach of 
trust.220 Of course, the trustee is required to pay trust creditors out of her 
personal assets in this case, but the problem is that when the trustee in 
breach of trust goes bankrupt or incapable, the successive trustee has no 
liability to cover the original trustee’s fault.221 This problem, sensibly 
 
 216. Jennings v. Mather [1902] 1 KB 1 (Eng.). In this case, Jennings was a trust creditor of 
the trustee Mather when he was carrying on the business in accordance with the trust. Jennings, 
being unable to obtain payment, sued Mather and got a judgment to execute the trust assets. In the 
meantime, Mather had been adjudicated bankrupt, and his liquidator claimed the trust assets 
seized by Jennings to be the bankruptcy estate of Mather. The county court believed that the trust 
assets seized by the trust creditor for debt redemption did not pass to the bankruptcy liquidator of 
the trustee, and therefore gave judgment for Jennings. When the case was appealed to the Queen’s 
Bench and then the King’s Bench, both Benches disagreed with the county court. Kennedy J. in 
the Queen’s Bench said that the trustee had a right to an indemnity from the trust assets to repay 
trust creditors, and this right was equitable or a lien over the trust assets. When the trustee went 
bankrupt, his lien or equitable right on behalf of the trust creditor was transferred to the 
liquidator. See Jennings v. Mather, [1902] 1 Q.B. 108, 117 (Eng.). In the King’s Bench, Mathew 
L.J. said “It would be obviously impossible that the execution creditor should be entitled to have 
property which was vested in Mather upon the trusts of the deed taken in execution for a debt for 
which Mather was personally liable.” Jennings, 1 K.B. 1 at 7-8. In conclusion, judges asserted 
that the trust creditor could not satisfy his claim by directly seizing the trust assets but by 
realizing the trustee’s equitable right to reimburse out of the trust assets. See also Philip Pettit, 
EQUITY AND THE LAW OF TRUSTS 413-14 (12th ed. 2012); Perring v Draper [1997] EGCS 109 
(Eng.). 
 217. Smith, Scottish Trusts in the Common Law, supra note 215, at 5-6. 
 218. Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note 18, at art. 17. 
 219. Id. art. 37 (explaining that “The charges paid and the debts owed to a third party by the 
trustee in the course of handling trust business shall be borne by the trust property. Where the 
trustee effects such payment in advance with his own property, he shall have the priority right to 
be paid with the trusted property.”). 
 220. Id. art. 36 (emphasizing that “Where the trustee disposes of the trust property against the 
purpose of the trust or causes losses to the trust property due to his departure from his 
administrative duties or his improper handling of trust business, he may not ask to be paid before 
he restores the property to its former state or makes compensation.”). 
 221. Id. art. 41 (If the former trustee is dissolved or declared bankrupt, he shall “[hand] over 
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handled by virtue of the separation of liabilities in China, has been a 
concern in the world of common law.222 
Third, the separate patrimony theory can explain the relative nature 
of the beneficiary’s right, which requires the trustee to transfer benefits 
to the beneficiary only within the value of trust assets.223 The 
beneficiary cannot extend her right to the private assets of the trustee or 
of the settlor.224 Furthermore, in the event that the trustee simultaneously 
manages several trust schemes, the beneficiary of one trust scheme 
cannot acquire benefits from another trust scheme.225 These scenarios 
are consistent with the separate patrimony theory, where the beneficiary 
only has interests in the specific trust patrimony.226 
Fourth, the separate patrimony provides a sound theoretical base to 
the hallmark of bankruptcy remoteness of the beneficiary’s right. 
Pursuant to the bankruptcy rule, when the trustee is bankrupt, her 
private creditors, trust creditors, and the beneficiary may lay claims to 
her assets. The Trust Law, however, overrides the bankruptcy rule. The 
trust assets do not belong to the liquidated assets of either the settlor or 
the trustee.227 The trust continues to exist for the benefit of the 
beneficiary.228 The private creditors cannot attach the trust assets for 
debt payoffs. The trustee’s liquidator should fully preserve the trust 
assets prior to a new trustee taking over the trust affairs.229 Why are the 
trust assets immune from the bankruptcy? Why are the private creditors 
unable to attach trust assets? Neither the entrusted agency nor the third-
 
the trust property and affairs to the new trustee . . . [and] shall be exempted from the liability for 
issues listed in the report, except for the illegitimate acts committed by him.”) (emphasis added).  
 222. Professor Smith states that in the common law trust, the trust creditor loses any access to 
the trust property if the trustee has lost his right of indemnity against the trust assets. This 
problem has resulted in reforms in many common law jurisdictions, such as the United States and 
Jersey. Professor Smith observes that “[t]his represents a significant change to the common law 
trust’s original structure,” and the common law trust, to some extent, is moving towards the 
Scottish trust, which is conceptualized by the separate patrimony theory. For a fuller account, See 
2010 W.A. Wilson Memorial Lecture, supra note 215, at 29-35. 
 223. Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note 18, art. 34. 
 224. Id. art. 15.  
 225. Id. art. 29. 
 226. Gretton, Trusts without Equity, supra note 179, at 612. As an exception, the beneficiary 
can acquire interests of the private assets of the trustee when the trustee breaches the trust 
instrument. See id. art. 37. 
 227. Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note 18, at arts. 15-16; Xintuo Gongshi Guanli Banfa (信
託公司管理辦法) [Measures for the Administration of Trust Companies] (promulgated by China 
Banking Regulatory Commission, Jan. 23, 2007, effective March 1, 2007) art. 3 [hereinafter 
MATC]. 
 228. Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note 18, at art. 52. 
 229. Id. art. 39. 
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party-beneficial contract could provide a desirable explanation. Yet the 
separate patrimony makes sense. If the trustee is presumed as the owner 
of the trust patrimony, the liabilities and assets in the trust patrimony are 
distinct from the trustee’s private patrimony. “In this way there is 
segregation not only of assets . . . but of liabilities as well,” says Reid.230 
“Each patrimony thus has its own creditors.”231 Only the private 
patrimony can be used to pay the private creditors, and only the 
beneficiary and trust creditors can claim from the trust patrimony. 
Therefore, the beneficiary and trust creditors exclude the private 
creditors’ attachment on the trust assets “not because they have a right 
which is real or quasi-real but because they have a right in a different 
patrimony.”232 The conclusion is no different when the settlor, under 
China’s indeterminate ownership model, is the owner of the trust 
patrimony. 
Fifth, the separate patrimony theory may work well even when the 
ownership of trust assets is indeterminate. The trust patrimony is 
segregated from the settlor’s private patrimony as well as the trustee’s 
private patrimony. The trust patrimony is like a juristic person to some 
degree. Perhaps this is why the trust patrimony can exist as bona 
vacantia in some jurisdictions, such as in Quebec.233 Although it is 
preferential to vest the trust patrimony in the trustee, the ownership 
actually is not significant according to the nature of trust patrimony. 
The really important element is the administration of trust patrimony in 
the best interest of the beneficiary. 
Sixth, the separate patrimony theory may ameliorate the Trust Law 
by restraining the settlor’s extensive rights when she owns the trust 
assets. Under the special patrimony theory, the owner of assets in the 
trust patrimony will be automatically bound by liabilities in it.234 The 
fiduciary duty and duty of care imposed on the trustee by Article 25 of 
the Trust Law are not only the trustee’s liabilities but also liabilities 
contained in the trust patrimony. Therefore, when the settlor is the 
owner of the trust patrimony, it may be reasonable to infer that the 
settlor also bears the fiduciary duty and duty of care, although the Trust 
Law does not incorporate such requirement directly.235 The fiduciary 
 
 230. Reid, Conceptualizing, supra note 43, at 226. 
 231. Id. at 225. 
 232. Id. at 226.  
 233. Id. at 226, 228.  
 234. See id. 
 235. Professor Kenneth Reid thought that this argument might be bold. On the basis of the 
patrimony practice in Scotland, he doubted that the idea of a separate patrimony, at least by itself, 
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duty and duty of care restrain the settlor from abusing her extensive 
rights arbitrarily and compel the settlor to behave in the interest of the 
beneficiary. Of course, the settlor can simply shirk the fiduciary duty 
and duty of care by abstaining from owning the trust assets. Therefore, 
such inference, if appreciated, may generate a windfall—settlor-owned 
trusts are to some extent reduced in practice. Because the constructive 
trust is not permitted in China,236 however, such inference cannot be 
further extended to the third party acquiring the trust patrimony. Once 
the trust patrimony is transferred out of the trust, the trust patrimony no 
longer exists. The third party only gets trust assets but no trust liabilities 
because trust liabilities are premised on the trust relationship and there 
is no such relationship between the third party and trust parties. In 
addition, the special patrimony theory does nothing to circumscribe the 
settlor’s extensive rights when the trustee is the owner of trust assets. In 
this case, trust liabilities are only imposed on the trustee, and the settlor 
bears no such burden. 
Finally, the biggest challenge to take this theory as the conceptual 
foundation of the Trust Law may be its novelty in China, but the 
patrimony’s pivotal notion—a consolidation of assets and liabilities—is 
nothing new within the Chinese legal system. It can be reflected by at 
least three patrimony-analogous institutions. The first is the bankruptcy 
estate. Not only does the bankruptcy estate contain assets of a bankrupt 
entity, it also contains liabilities to liquidate assets and then distribute to 
stockholders (mainly creditors).237 The bankruptcy administrator takes 
over the assets and assumes the liabilities.238 This particularity has been 
 
was sufficient to impose additional duties on the settlor. See E-mail from Kenneth G.C. Reid, 
Professor of Law at University of Edinburgh (on file with author). Professor Reid’s discretion on 
this notion is understandable on the background of Scotland where it is very clear that the trustee 
owns the special patrimony. However, if the settlor could own the special patrimony in Scotland, 
just like that in China, Scottish trust law might have already imposed some duties on the settlor 
by virtue of the special patrimony theory. Of course, this is not a provable hypothesis, but my 
point is that the unworkability of this notion in Scotland may not sufficiently subvert its 
application in China. Id.  
 236. Article 8 of the Trust Law requires all trusts in China to be in writing, so there is no 
room to accommodate the constructive trust in the Trust Law. In fact, most civilian jurisdictions, 
if not all of them, do not accept the constructive trust when transplanting the trust institution. 
Trust Law 2001 (China), supra note 18, at art. 8. 
 237. Bankruptcy assets refer to all the assets belonging to the debtor prior to the bankruptcy 
proceeding and assets obtained by the debtor during the bankruptcy proceeding. See Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Pochan Fa (中华人民共和国企业破产法) Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 
of the People’s Republic of China arts. 30, 111-19 (promulgated by the People’s Republic of 
China, Aug. 27, 2006, effective Jun. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Law of China]. 
 238. The bankruptcy administrator shall perform duties such as taking over all the assets, 
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well acknowledged by Chinese academia.239 Another analogous 
institution is a foundation that is a not-for-profit legal person to manage 
donation for public purposes.240 Unlike the company or other social 
associations, a foundation has no shareholders or members, it only has a 
collection of donated assets.241 It is very similar to the charitable trust 
except that the foundation has a legal personality, so many Chinese 
scholars have argued that a foundation is a patrimony with a legal 
personality.242 
The third institution is the decedent’s estate. It is a patrimony in 
essence, despite China’s Law of Succession not using the name. Once a 
person is dead, all her lawful assets, as well as taxes and debts, become 
an estate. The testamentary executor may deduct payable liabilities up 
to the value of assets before making any distribution to successors.243 If 
the testamentary executor does not make a complete payoff of 
liabilities, successors must pay debts up to the value of successive assets 
unless they relinquish the successive right.244 When the succession is 
arranged as the testamentary trust, the special patrimony theory is more 
comprehensive than the contract theory in conceptualizing China’s 
Trust Law because the special patrimony theory also covers the 
testamentary trust. In contrast, the conceptualization by contract is only 
limited to the contract-based inter vivos trust. Although nearly all the 
trusts in China are business trusts established by contracts at present, the 
special patrimony theory is really for the booming of testamentary trust 
in the future, along with the expanding wealthy group in China. 
In sum, the separate patrimony conceptualizes China’s Trust Law 
well and even improves the Law to some extent. Above analyses 
 
investigating into the financial status of the debtor, deciding the internal management of the 
debtor, managing and disposing the debtor’s assets, participating law suits on behalf of the 
debtor, etc. See id. art. 25. 
 239. See YONGJUN LI, PO CHAN FA LU ZHI DU: QING SUAN YU ZAI JIAN [BANKRUPTCY 
LEGAL SYSTEM] 224 (2000) (stating that the bankruptcy estate is viewed as a subject with 
specific purpose and relative independence, and some Chinese scholars even treat it as a quasi-
juristic person). 
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demonstrate that many articles in the Trust Law have implied the 
special patrimony, so there shall be few technical impediments to fit the 
Trust Law with the special patrimony theory. It can appropriately 
explain most characteristics of the Trust Law. Under this theory, the 
identity of the owner of the trust patrimony is not an important issue, as 
long as she could perform the liabilities to the beneficiary. Therefore, 
the special patrimony theory works well in the context of the ambiguous 
ownership. The segregation of the trust patrimony from the private 
patrimonies of both the settlor and the trustee soundly explains the 
peculiarities of the beneficiary’s right. Meanwhile, the settlor’s 
extensive rights may have a kind of checks and balances when she is the 
owner of trust patrimony because the liabilities within the trust 
patrimony may be automatically imposed onto the settlor. 
These characteristics of the Trust Law are designed by legislators 
who (mistakenly) understand the trust institution based on contract law 
and politicians who intend to enhance the acceptance and popularity of 
the trust institution. If the contract account was continuously followed 
to explain China’s Trust Law, theoretical puzzles and practical 
uncertainties may never be swept out. The special patrimony theory 
does not completely expel the contract out of the trust; rather, it replaces 
the role of the contract to conceptualize the trust and keeps the role of 
the contract to establish the inter vivo trust. The testamentary trust, out 
of the coverage of the contract theory, can also be accommodated by the 
special patrimony theory. Once the puzzles and uncertainties regarding 
the trust regime are eliminated, its wide use by the general public is just 
a matter of time. Although the special patrimony theory is the right 
direction forward, it still deserves more research and even time before it 
can be extensively recognized in China. Those patrimony-analogy 
institutions that have already existed within the China legal system will 
certainly make the recognition easier. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
China’s Trust Law was born with three characteristics. The first is 
the special model of indeterminate ownership of trust assets. The Law 
formulates an ambiguous definition of trust, and the transfer of the title 
to trust assets is not a precondition to a valid trust, so the trust assets 
may be owned by either the settlor or the trustee. The second is the 
extensive rights enjoyed by the settlor, which is not an intrinsic feature 
of the common law trust. The third is shared by many trust-recognizing 
civilian jurisdictions. The beneficiary’s right is essentially a right in 
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personam rather than a right in rem, but at the same time it is peculiar in 
two aspects: it is against the trustee merely within the spectrum of trust 
assets; and the trust assets are shielded by the Trust Law away from 
bankruptcy rules. The considerations of easy reception and technical 
feasibility mainly give rise to these characteristics. However, they are 
not only confusing in theory, but difficult in practice. 
Conceptualization is indispensable to deal with these 
characteristics and problems. The contract theory has been widely 
perceived as the conceptual basis of China’s Trust Law. However, it 
fails to explain the characteristics very well after careful comparison 
with the trust regime. In contrast, the special patrimony theory, with a 
fundamental notion of segregation of assets and liabilities, broadly 
serves this purpose. Many articles in the Trust Law have implied the 
special patrimony. Meanwhile, it can to a great extent clarify the three 
characteristics, by which the special patrimony theory removes 
theoretical confusions and practical uncertainties of the trust institution 
and makes it more popular among the general public. Although it 
provides the right orientation to conceptualize the Chinese trust, 
admittedly, the special patrimony theory is not flawless, and it needs 
more time for the Chinese to comprehensively recognize it. 
 
